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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)Q .
ISSUES A N D STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1:

Summary Judgment on Causation Can Only Be Granted Where
Schindler Shows N o Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain.
Schindler Only Demonstrated Alternative Theories of Causation, Not a
Complete Absence of Cause.

"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court will view the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, \ 2, 67 P.3d 1042. "The district court's legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness."
Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, U 8,152 P.3d 312.
ISSUE 2:

An Affidavit Need Only Be Made on Personal Knowledge and May
Contain Statements Regarding Injury Causation. Florez' Affidavit
Recited Her Personal Knowledge of Events and Injury Causation.

"[A] trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of
discretion." Murdoch v. Springville Mum Corp., 1999 UT 39, \ 25, 982 P.2d 65.
ISSUE 3:

Expert Witnesses May Rely on the Testimony and Records of Other
Witnesses in Reaching Their Conclusions. Dr. Morgan Relied, As Do
Many Doctors, on the Diagnoses and Records of Other Physicians.

"The trial court has wide discretion, and such decisions are reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard." Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, \ 20, 74 P.3d
635.

1

ISSUE 4:

Reversing Denial of a Motion For New Trial or Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict Requires Marshaling the Evidence and
Showing How It Could Not Support the Verdict. Schindler Does Not
Marshal the Evidence.

Reversing a denied motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict
obligates the appealing party to "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Thereafter, this Court
reviews "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable
minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict."' White v. Fox, 665
P.2d 1297,1300 (Utah 1983).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUES AND RULES OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56
Utah Rule of Evidence 702
Utah Rule of Evidence 703
Utah Rule of Evidence 705
MUJI 2nd CV 2018
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61
(full texts attached as Addendum A)
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Defendant Schindler Corporation admitted liability in this personal injury case. Left
with only causation and amount of damages as a defense, Shindler Corporation chose to
attack on two fronts. First, they attempted to demonstrate through an exhaustive
2

examination of the medical record that their negligence did not cause injury. However,
Schindler did not even bother to call witnesses who could testify to the major injury suffered
by Connie, BPPV. Second, perhaps recognizing the weakness in objective facts supporting
their defense of medical causation, Schindler Corporation chose to attack the credibility and
personal veracity of the plaintiff, Connie Florez. By personally attacking Connie Florez,
Schindler opened a door to much of what they claim as error on appeal. Schindler should
not be allowed to call into question the credibility and veracity of Connie Florez, and then
claim reversible error when they find testimony and rebuttal argument made by counsel
unpalatable.
Following four days of testimony from nine witnesses, eight of the witnesses having
testified on behalf of Florez, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Florez. Florez submitted
$23,040 in past medical expenses; the jury awarded her $17,032.31. Florez sought more than
$125,000 in future medical expenses; the jury awarded her $93,350.00. Counsel argued that
Florez' loss of quality of life should be equivalent to three or four times the amount the jury
determined Florez needed for medical care resulting from the incident. The jury's award for
noneconomic damages was only two times the amount of their determination of Florez'
economic damages. Clearly, the jury carefully weighed the evidence and argument and
rendered a balanced verdict which did not give either side all that they were seeking.
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
1.

The Incident and Resulting Lawsuit

Schindler operated and maintained elevators at the 23rd Street and Wall IRS building

3

in Ogden, Utah. Since this IRS building opened in 2001, and for some period after
Appellee's incident in 2004, Schindler's elevators repeatedly malfunctioned. (R. 185 at 8:21 R. 186 at 9:22) In the early summer of 2004, Connie Florez was working at the 23rd Street
IRS building in Ogden, Utah. While returning from her thirty minute lunch break,
Schindler's elevator again malfunctioned, coming to a dead stop, and leaving Connie trapped
inside. (R. 909 at 245-49).
Approximately seven feet wide by ten feet tall, Schindler's elevator lacked air
conditioning and cooling. (R. 909 at 251:15-252:2) Florez contacted Schindler for assistance
by pushing a help button located inside the elevator. (R. 909 at 252:23-253:4) Schindler
indicated it could be at least an hour before assistance arrived and Schindler would contact
Florez. (R. 909 at 253:17-18)
After the initial abrupt halt of the elevator, the elevator made four additional
movements. As Schindler's elevator repeatedly rose and fell, Florez leaned against the wall
and gripped onto the rails located inside the elevator. (R. 909 at 249:16-17) As time passed
and Florez received no contact from Schindler, co-workers gathered, attempting to release
Florez from the elevator. (R. 909 at 260:1-10)
The temperature inside the elevator escalated, and so did Florez' anxiety. (R. 909 at
254:10-255:3) After being trapped for more than thirty minutes in the heat, and along with
her increasing anxiety, Florez began having heart palpitations. Shouting through the closed
elevator to co-workers, Florez requested her heart medicine from inside her purse. (R. 909 at
256:5-11) Florez' co-workers worked together to try and open the doors. The IRS
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employees pried open the doors just long enough to throw Florez' purse through the small
opening. (R. 909 at 256:5-11) Florez took a nitroglycerin pill for her palpitating heart. (R.
909 at 257:2-11)
After almost an hour after being trapped in Schindler's hot elevator (R. 909 at 255:812) and without Schindler appearing or calling with an update (R. 909 at 257:17-25), two IRS
employees manipulated an overhead release latch to open the doors, allowing Florez to
escape the elevator. (R. 908 at 97:4-6; R. 908 at 98:20-25) When the doors opened, Florez
was sitting on the ground, braced against the wall, fearing further movement of the elevator.
(R. 908 at 71:25-72:6) She was extremely anxious, tired, and overheated. Although Florez
looked "scared, very scared" when the doors opened, she came to her feet and attempted to
exit. (R. 908 at 98:3-9; R. 908 at 128:8-13)
After taking her first step or two outside of the hot elevator, the cold air hit Florez
and she blacked out. Florez fell on her left side, hitting her head, ribs and shoulder. (R. 909
at 267:16-23) Witnesses testified Florez blacked out extremely suddenly, hitting the floor
"like a sack of potatoes". Eyewitness testimony further indicated Florez' head "bounced"
off the hard floor and made a "loud noise" when it hit. (R. 908 at 75:8-9; R. 908 at 98:21-22)
When Florez regained consciousness, she was pale, grey and her body was physically shaking.
(R. 908 at 79:5 and R. 908 at 130:13-17) Emergency personnel arrived, placed an IV, put
Florez on a backboard, and transported her to the emergency room. (R. 909 at 262:14-21)
Florez was extremely nauseous; she repeatedly heaved during the ambulance ride to the
hospital. (R. 909 at 263:19-25; Plaintiffs Exhibit 115; Defendant's Exhibit 41)

5

At the hospital, E.R. staff attended to Florez. (R. 909 at 264:1-12) Florez had pain in
her head and her entire left side. (R. 909 at 264:10-14) Florez spent several hours in the
emergency room; the primary concern was blood work and an EKG to determine if Florez'
fainting was related to her heart condition. The physician ruled out any heart issue and
concluded Florez suffered from a "Vasovagal syncopal episode and Hypokalemia," or, in
laymen's terms, anxiety, nausea, respiratory distress, and fainting due to her stressful situation
and overheating. Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary (1995). (R. 0171 and R. 910 at 375:1-3;
R. 910 at 379:21-380:13) After determining that Florez had fainted and was not suffering a
serious heart condition, staff instructed Florez to follow-up with her primary physician for
additional complaints. (R. 0158)
The next day, Florez visited a primary care provider. When it was discovered Florez
had been injured at her workplace, Florez was sent home with instructions to return after
notifying workers compensation. These facts were documented by the clinic. (R. Plaintiff
Exhibit 115 at 035) However, Schindler chose to use this forestalled medical visit to attack
Florez and her supervisor's credibility, implying these witnesses lied when they represented
Florez missed work the following day to go the doctor. (R. 908 at 92:2-21; R. 911 at 679:16680:1)
Within two days of the incident, Florez received care and began physical therapy
treatment for her neck and rib injury. Within a few months, multiple providers determined
that when Florez' head bounced off the ground, the Odoconia in her ear broke, leaving
Candaliths loose in the ear canal, resulting in a condition called Benign Paroxysmal Positional
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Vertigo or "BPPV." At trial, the Candaliths or loose Odoconia were described, and
interchangeably referred to, as "crystals" inside of the ear. Once these crystals break, the
individual experiences permanent vertigo; the vertigo can wax and wane in severity but, it can
only improve with daily exercises, as well as periodic medication and medical manipulation of
the ear canal by a trained professional. (R. 909 at 290:10-23; R. 910 at 436:8-22; R. 910 at
443:15-19; R. 910 at 410:9-17; R. 910 at 467:12-16)
Schindler argues Florez had BPPV prior to her 2004 fall. However, the medical
testimony unanimously agrees that trauma causes BPPV. (R. 910 at 476:8-9; R. 910 at 402:36). Schindler offers no evidence, or explanation, of how or when Florez previously injured
her head and left ear. Instead, Schindler claims that BPPV could be obtained from the
migraines or viral infections in Florez' history but this was refuted. (R. 910 at 467:17-25;
R. 910 at 475:6-9) Florez was not diagnosed with BPPV prior to her fall, nor was she given
the daily treatments or periodic medication needed to treat BPPV prior to her fall. (R.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 116)
Florez openly admits she experienced prior incidents of dizziness associated with
miscellaneous medical conditions, particularly with her heart condition and the resulting
treadmill tests. Yet, Florez had never experienced the persistent, unrelenting, dizziness that
occurs with BPPV. Individuals can experience dizziness or vertigo for a variety of reasons
and yet, it does not mean they have BPPV. (R. 910 at 416:23-417:4; R. 910 at 481:23-482:1;
R. 910 at 403:6-11)
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Schindler presents an incomplete and erroneous picture, consistently omitting any
facts or context of prior dizziness. (R. 910 at 405:2-17; R. 908 at 61:11-62:6) Schindler's
appeal lists nine instances of dizziness complaints over approximately fifteen years. Seven of
the nine instances were documented when Florez was being treated for her heart1. (R.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 116 at PE 026, 022, 003, 013, 038-39, 030, 058). Schindler refuses to
accept the medical testimony and insists all records of prior dizziness equate to Florez having
BPPV prior to 2004 - no medical expert agrees with Schindler's conclusion.
By contrast, the evidence before the jury and part of the record on appeal, firmly
establishes Florez' position that the 2004 trauma caused her BPPV. Two years prior to her
collapse and trauma after exiting the elevator, in March of 2002, an Ear Nose and Throat
Specialist performed a cDix-Hallpike Maneuver' on Florez when she visited him with vertigo
and swollen glands. The Dix-Hallpike Maneuver is the initial step, in a series of steps, to
diagnosing BPPV. A positive Dix-Hallpike causes nystagmus in the patient's eyes. (R. 910 at
455:18-25) Florez'Dix-Hallpike did not demonstrate BPPV. (R. 910 at 465:20-466:8) The
March 2002 record referenced an inner ear infection and the physician concluded Florez was
suffering from inflammation of her ear, not BPPV. (R. 910 at 424:10-12)
Inflammation of the ear can cause temporary vertigo, but resolves without assistance.
Consistently, Florez did not complain of vertigo for two years following resolution of the
diagnosed inflammation. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) The ENT who conducted the 2002
1

Schindler's brief erroneously cites to tab 2 and 11 of it's trial exhibit; (Schindler's Brief p.
11, b and g). The citation in those instances should read tab 3 and 14 of Schindler's medical
exhibit. Also, Schindler's reference to a record dated 12/12/90 should read 12/10/90.
Florez references the same medical records in Florez' trial exhibit, for the court's
convenience.
8

examination, relied upon by Schindler as definitive evidence of pre-existing BPPV, was Dr.
Siddoway. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) Dr. Siddoway testified at trial and his testimony was
aggressively challenged by Schindler. Dr. Siddoway remained firm in his conclusion that
Florez did not suffer from BPPV in 2002. (R. 910 at 465:1-8)
Dr. Siddoway concluded that Florez began suffering from BPPV in 2004, following
her fall at the IRS building. (R. 910 at 424:18-425:5) Further, Dr. Siddoway testified that the
condition that Florez presented with following the fall in 2004 was not the same problem
that she had two years earlier when she saw him in March of 2002 with vertigo. (R. 910 at
425:10-12).
2.

Schindler's Motion for Summary Judgment

On March 13, 2005, Florez filed a Complaint in Second District Court. During two
years of litigation, Schindler's litigation efforts involved a single discovery request and the
deposition of Florez. Schindler then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30,
2007. (Docket at l). 2 Judge Jones presided over Schindler's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied the request. (R. 0323;0327)
Schindler premised summary judgment on a two pronged causation argument. First,
Schindler suggested causation could not be shown because Florez blacked out due to
nitroglycerin rather than being trapped in the elevator. Schindler offered no medical
2

With the exception of deposing Florez' retained expert, Dr. Morgan, after filing the Motion
for Summary Judgment, Schindler engaged in no other discovery during the entire three years
of litigation leading up to trial. (Docket at 1-3). Indeed, the whole of Schindler's case on
appeal is an attempt to take a second bite at the apple. Failing to pursue a meaningful
defense below, Schindler asks this court to second-guess the district court judges rulings and
set aside the verdict reached by a jury who, after deliberations, gave Florez less than she
asked in compensation.
9

testimony or competent, admissible evidence to support their argument. Schindler
supported their theory of causation solely by reference to an internet website
www.howthingswork.com. Schindler never produced a medical expert that agreed with their
position and, ultimately, Schindler abandoned the argument at trial.
By contrast, Florez attached an affidavit asserting that she had never experienced a
fainting side effect from her nitroglycerin during the many years she had been on the
medication. (R. 0179-81) Further, Florez attached the Emergency Room Record, wherein
the doctor diagnosed her as suffering from a vasovagal syncopal episode and hypokalemia.
(R. 0217) Perhaps more importantly, it was undisputed that Florez' ingestion of nitroglycerin
was necessitated by her prolonged entrapment in the elevator. (R. 0173, ^| 1). Accordingly,
even if the heart medication caused the fainting, Florez only took the medication because of
anxiety and heart palpitations as a result of being trapped in Schindler's elevator.
Second, Schindler attacked causation of Florez' BPPV injury by pointing to prior
episodes of vertigo. In opposition, Florez relied on Dr. Morgan's expert report. Dr.
Morgan's report indicated Florez suffered a 4% permanent impairment from BPPV related
to the elevator incident. (R. 0205-11) Schindler, presented no counter-evidence or expert on
the issue of BPPV. Further, Schindler characterizes Florez' affidavit as her "sole" evidence
of causation on summary judgment. (Schindler's Brief at 6, \ 1) Although Schindler neglects
to explain its omission of Dr. Morgan's causation opinion, Schindler assumably interprets
Dr. Morgan's report as failing to offer a causation opinion. Notably, Judge Jones (R. 907 at
13:12-25), Judge West (Addendum B, at 26:1-4;) and Dr. Morgan (R. 0399 at 13:17-24; R.
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910 at 380:11-13; R. 910 at 381:9-12; R. 910 at 382:7-17), all reject such an attempted
interpretation by Schindler. The record on appeal supports the trial court's finding "that
there really is a dispute of fact here as to causation". (R. 907 at 13:19-20)
Under the "Impression" section of Dr. Morgan's Independent Medical Examination,
it states "Benignpositional vertigo [BPVJ as related to the elevator incident." (R. 0209) Schindler

complains that the word "causation" is no where in Dr. Morgan's report. (Schindler's Brief
at pg 6-7, T| 2) Schindler omits that Dr. Morgan utilized the phrase "as related to" the
elevator incident versus the phrase "as caused by" the elevator incident. Dr. Morgan in his
deposition was asked ". . . what did you mean by the term cas related to?" and Dr. Morgan's
response, " - - that was causation related to the elevator accident". (R. 0399 at 13:17-24).
Dr. Morgan reaffirmed causation at trial. (R. 910 at 380:11-13; R. 910 at 381:9-12; R.
910 at 382:7-17). Further, at trial Dr. Siddoway confirmed the accuracy of Dr. Morgan's
opinion by refuting Schindler's argument that Florez' had BPPV in 2002, prior to the fall.
(R. 910 at 425:10-13; R. 910 at 465:1-8;)
3.

Florez' Affidavit

In opposition to Schindler's motion for summary judgment, Florez submitted an
affidavit disputing multiple facts. Florez' affidavit (R. 0179-81) opposed Schindler's
inaccurate representations that: (1) Florez undisputedly fainted because she ingested
nitroglycerin; (2) Florez undisputedly suffered no anxiety while inside the elevator; (3) Florez
undisputedly suffered no symptoms after she fainted; and, (4) Florez obtained no medical
treatment as a result of the fall. (R. 0162-63; R. 0167) Florez further disputed Schindler's
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facts with medical records and deposition testimony. (R. 0183-217) Florez simply recited, in
sequential order, her description of the events that transpired, as set forth above.
Schindler moved to strike the affidavit of Florez at the trial court and Judge Jones
denied that request, indicating he did not find Florez' affidavit ". . .out of line. 1 mean
normally the one who has been injured is the first person you want to talk to find out what
happened." (R. 907 at 14:7-9)
4.

Dr. Morgan's Testimony

Prior to trial, Schindler filed a motion to exclude Dr. Morgan, relying on multiple
arguments. Judge West denied Schindler's motion. 3 (R. 656; Addendum B) First, Schindler
sought to exclude Dr. Morgan because the diagnosis was made by Dr. Siddoway, not Dr.
Morgan. (R. 353) Second, Schindler argued that Dr. Morgan's opinion was "based not on
any expertise but rather on a flawed conclusion." (R. 353). However, Schindler offered no
competing expert opinion or any authority to challenge Dr. Morgan's methods or means by
which he reached his opinion.
The evidence of record demonstrates Dr. Morgan is highly competent in evaluating
causation of injuries as he is the specialist used for this type of exercise of reviewing records
and performing examinations to determine causation. Dr. Morgan has been performing this
exact task for over a decade at the request of individuals, other physicians and government
entities. (R. 910 at 366:15-370:24)
3

Schindler claims that "arguments on Schindler's Motion in Limine were conducted in
chambers and no transcript of the argument exists". (Schindler's Brief at 2, FN1) In
actuality, counsel were present when the arguments took place in the courtroom. Florez
provides the transcript from this hearing as Addendum B.
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Schindler's campaign against Dr. Morgan derives from isolating incidents in Florez'
fifty-six year medical history wherein dizziness is noted as a complaint and then using those
instances to conclude Dr. Morgan's opinion is wrong, and therefore, incompetent. (R. 0366,
TJ3) Schindler is unable to produce a medical expert to medically validate Schindler's position.
More specifically, Schindler has been unable to establish any of the prior instances amounted
to BPPV rather than just dizziness as a symptom associated with heart arrhythmia or viral
inflammation. The unrefuted and unchallenged testimony from the medical experts is that
Florez' prior dizziness did not equate to BPPV. (R. 910 at 425:10-13)
5.

Testimony and Notice of Florez' Medical Expenses

Schindler requests a directed verdict by representing Florez "did not present one
shred of evidence" on Florez' medical expenses. (Schindler's Brief at 43, In 4-5) In actuality,
three medical experts4 testified to the summary of medical expenses incurred by Florez and
admitted into evidence. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) First, Dr. Morgan testified he refers
individuals out routinely as part of his work for workers compensation and therefore, has
knowledge of medical costs in the community. He testified he reviewed the costs detailed in
Florez' Medical Expense Summary and found them to be reasonable and necessarily incurred
as a result of the 2004 elevator incident. (R. 910 at 383:22-384:8) Second, Dr. Amann's
testimony confirmed the reasonableness and need for Florez' neck and rib expenses. (R. 909
4

Contrary to Schindler's representation, Dr. Amann and Dr. .Siddoway were not precluded
from offering expert testimony. (Schindler's Brief at 7-8) Rather, the trial court found that
without production of a Rule 26 report, the treating physicians could "give opinions, expert
opinions, within their expertise . . ." but, they were not allowed to "extrapolate it out", i.e.
offer legal causation. (Addendum B at 17:15-19; R. 909 at 154:13-155:8) There is no
evidence the physicians exceeded this one limitation set by the court.
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at 186:9 - 188:22) Third, Dr. Siddoway's testimony confirmed the reasonableness of
expenses specific to Florez' BPPV. (R. 910 at 447:3-448:19)
Florez' medical expense summary was properly admitted under Rule 1006 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. Schindler alleges error, claiming Schindler never received the underlying
invoices required by Rule 1006. (Schindler's Brief at 43, In 5) However, the record
demonstrates eight occasions, prior to trial, on which Schindler had been provided the
invoices underlying Florez' medical expense summary. (R. 0518) The ninth production
occurred the first day of trial, in front of the court. The trial court found Schindler had
received notice of the underlying expenses. (R. 911 at 729:12-14)
Based on the court's ruling of notice, Florez' never burdened the jury with the
overwhelming invoices. Yet, due to Schindler's unrelenting objection that Florez' summary
was insufficient without the invoices, Florez stipulated to Schindler providing the jury with
four medical expense summaries created by Schindler. (R. 911 at 722:6-729:10; R. 0638-42)
Evidencing Schindler had received the underlying invoices, Schindler's counsel created its
own medical expense summaries. (R. 911 at 689:3-12) Those summaries reflected
Schindler's various arguments, i.e. the majority of expenses can actually be discounted as
treatment for neck and back (R. 911 at 689:13-23) only two thousand of the expenses are
related to her rib injury, (R. 911 at 693:19-694:1), you should only award the ER visit and
ambulance ride (R. 911 at 703:15-704:4), etc. While Florez disagreed with Schindler's
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categorization of Florez' expenses, these summaries were provided to the jury and nullify any
alleged prejudice to Schindler. Schindler's compilation and submission of its own medical
expense summaries to the jury demonstrates adequate access to the invoices underlying
Florez' medical expense summary. (R. 0638-42)
With respect to Florez' future medical expenses, no itemized numbers were admitted
into evidence. The jury was asked to determine this amount based on the medical testimony
that Florez' future care would be consistent with her maintenance care over the last few
years. Specifically, Florez' first two years of care were more expensive because of costs
related to the testing and diagnosing of her condition but, following that initial two years,
Florez had reached medical stability. Upon reaching medical stability, Florez' medical care
became maintenance care that would continue indefinitely. (R. 909 at 185:4-186:12; R. 910 at
449:5-11) Florez' maintenance care involved itemized costs for periodic doctor visits,
audiological therapy, and medications. (R. Plaintiffs Exhibit 117) Based on the evidence,
counsel's closing included arguments for assessing future damages consistent with the
maintenance care Florez had been receiving at the direction of Dr. Amann and Dr. Siddoway
since 2006. (R. 911 at 650:8-665:25)
6-

Jury Instruction on Pre-Existing Condition

Schindler claims Florez failed to establish she had a pre-existing BPPV condition.
(Schindler's Brief at 8, ^J 2) This is accurate. Florez did not introduce evidence of a pre-
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existing condition. At trial, Florez maintained her BPPV was a result of the 2004 incident
and was not pre-existing. Yet, Schindler omits that Schindler asserted Florez' BPPV preexisted the elevator incident. (Schindler's Brief at 45-47)
Schindler's primary defense was that Florez had not been injured. Schindler's
secondary defense was that even if the jury found Florez had been injured, Florez' BPPV
was pre-existing. (R. 908 at 55:2-6; 58-63; 64:2-12) With Schindler's defense, the trial court
believed it appropriate to instruct the jury on how to determine damages, if any, in light of a
pre-existing condition. (R. 910 at 559:6 - 601:17)
7.

Opening & Closing Arguments

Schindler asserts a variety of allegations on appeal based on counsel's comments
during opening and closing. Schindler's approach to counsel's arguments, mirrors their
attack on Florez' BPPV. Schindler abstracts miscellaneous comments, without reference to
context, to create an alleged condition of prejudice against Schindler. This condition simply
did not exist. The record, including the insurmountable fact that Schindler did not object to
the comments now cited on appeal, demonstrates there was no prejudicial attack levied
against Schindler because of their corporate status or size.
On the contrary, this was a case where Schindler had insufficient evidence and thus,
choose to attack the credibility of Florez, witnesses, and counsel. Counsel's comments were
made in defense to Schindler's trial tactic of bullying every witness, medical provider, and
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counsel.5 The trial court's ruling best illustrates the accurate condition at trial. In rejecting
Schindler's request for a new trial, Judge West ruled:
"[T]his was a hard fought, hotiy contested, jury trial. Emotions did run high.
A lot was at stake. Although the Court does not completely condone some of
the comments made by the Plaintiffs attorney during closing argument, taken
as a whole and in context, those comments did not rise to the level of invoking
the passion and prejudice of the jury. The juries' verdict appears well thought
out, rational, and not the result of passion or prejudice. It was not a 'runaway'
jury. It was not an excessive verdict. The verdict was well within the
discretion and prerogative of the jury" (R. at 0853, ^| 2)
In addition to arguing there were multiple offensive comments without any
specificity, Schindler cites to two, specific, instances that allegedly warrant a new trial. First,
5

Since Schindler hadn't contacted anyone, Schindler suggested Mr. Ward spoke to witnesses
improperly, manipulating testimony in conspiracy against Schindler (R. 911 at 676:23-677:4;
R. 910 at 451:3-10), arguing " Mr. Ward came in with his preconceived story and he tried to
get these witnesses to fit within his preconceived story". (R. 911 at 678:2-3)
Schindler's exhibit represented Florez was seen by Dr. Siddoway in 2003 for BPPV, less than
a year before the elevator incident, even though Schindler knew there was no medical record
for that date. After Dr. Siddoway testified under oath that there was no record because there
was no such visit, Schindler suggested Dr. Siddoway was lying, i.e. hiding the record. (R. 911
at 675:21-676:3; 676:23-677:4) Notably, Dr. Siddoway was not hired by Florez and did not
want to testify at trial; Dr. Siddoway had to be subpoenaed. Schindler's attack against Dr.
Siddoway demonstrates why treating physicians are unwilling to provide relevant testimony.
Schindler questioned where the overhead projector went and said Florez' counsel "took it
away" because, Mr. Ward "doesn't want you to look at the evidence". (R.911 at 674:8-9; R.
911 at 674:21-22)
Schindler was so adversarial and contentious at trial that counsel objected over 75 times and
to things such as Mr. Ward's reference to a record as "9" of 2004, instead of "September" of
2004 (R. 910 at 432:19-433:8) and Mr. Ward referencing records without first making sure he
explained where that record was in Schindler's exhibit (R. 910 at 428:3-429:18; R. 910 at 432:116). Yet, notably, Schindler did not object to the comments now claimed prejudicial,
demonstrating the benign tone and insignificance of these comments at trial.
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Schindler asserts counsel's arguments erroneously instructed the jury that Florez had a 25
year life expectancy. (Schindler's Brief at 23, No. 76 ) The record does not support
Schindler's assertion. During closing, counsel conducted a demonstration on calculating
future medical expenses based on the doctors testimony and the summaries of past medical
expenses. As part of this demonstration, counsel needed to use a figure for sake of argument
but, it was made clear that counsel was not relying on any evidence:
"Now, then the question becomes, well, how long is Connie's future? No one
knows. . . Nobody know, so you know, as I've looked and thought about it and
looked at the average side of this, we figured a fair thing was 25 years. She's
58 now, that would make her about 83. . .and by the way,you 're not bound by this
... If you think,

<C

I don't think she'll live more than 20 years", you can do that...

I

mean, we don't claim we have a crystal ball We're just trying to be fair." (R. 911 at
663:2-14)(emphasis added)
Counsel did not misrepresent there had been medical evidence that Florez would live an
additional 25 years. Moreover, Schindler did not object to the above comment at trial.
Second, Schindler states on appeal that Flore2' counsel misrepresented the law to the
jury during closing arguments. (Schindler's Brief at 49) The record, including the context of
the comments, demonstrate this did not occur.
During closing, Schindler's counsel attacked the credibility of Dr. Siddoway. (R. 911
at 675:21-676:3; 676:23-677:4) In response, Florez' counsel stated "So what that he doesn't
agree with Dr. Siddoway? That doesn't mean anything, folks. Don't let yourself be swayed
by that kind of nonsense. He had an obligation to bring in a doctor to say Dr. Siddoway is
wrong and he didn't. He just didn't." (R. 911 at 709:17-22)
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Schindler objected, informing the court that Florez' counsel had just testified that
Schindler had a legal obligation to bring in medical witnesses. Florez5 counsel responded by
indicating he was referring to a substantive obligation, he did not represent it was a "legal"
obligation. In front of the jury, Schindler convinced the court that Florez' counsel had,
indeed, stated "legal" obligation. To avoid more useless bickering, and out of respect for
the trial court, Florez' counsel took the blame. Counsel turned to the jury and stated " I take
it back. He doesn't have a legal obligation to bring anybody in." The record accurately
reflects counsel did not state Schindler had a "legal" obligation to bring in a doctor to refute
Dr. Siddoway. (R. 911 at 709:18-710:14)
SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT
Schindler presents four issues on appeal.
Summary Judgment:

Schindler contends the trial court erred in denying its motion

for summary judgment. However, summary judgment may only be granted where the
moving party demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact remain. Schindler argued
summary judgment by presenting an alternative theory of causation, yet failing to provide any
evidence or expert testimony which could support its theory. Schindler's sole authority used
to demonstrate 'no genuine issue of material fact' consisted of citing a website,
www.howstuffworks.com. Even accepting their theory has plausibility in the absence of
evidence and testimony, the argument cannot demonstrate the absence of genuine material
fact, precluding summary judgment. Namely, Schindler claimed that the nitroglycerin pills
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caused Connie to faint and, therefore, caused the head injury. Schindler's argument ignores
the fact that being trapped in the elevator caused Connie to ingest the nitroglycerin pills.
Schindler also suggests that Florez5 BPPV was not caused by the fall and points to a
large number of pre-fall vertigo incidents. Although BPPV induces vertigo, the mechanism
is significantly different from that which caused Connie's prior episodes. BPPV induces
vertigo through the inner ear and the mechanism of inducement was diagnosed in Florez and
supported by medical testimony. Simply by showing the instances of prior episodes and
attacking the credibility of the medical witnesses, Schindler argued no genuine issues
remained regarding causation of the BPPV. Schindler's attack, however, failed to
demonstrate no genuine issues of material fact remained and, more importantly, it also failed
to convince the jury on this theory as well.
Florez Affidavit:

Schindler suggests the trial court erred in not striking Florez'

affidavit. Because Florez' affidavit was based on personal knowledge and merely recited the
sequence of events as they occurred, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
strike the affidavit. Additionally, refusing to strike the affidavit does not create grounds for
reversal where other competent evidence prevented summary judgment
Dr. Morgan as Expert Witness: Dr. Morgan's extensive experience as an independent
medical exam reviewer for workers compensation, his training and background all
demonstrate his ability to review, summarize and offer opinions and conclusions regarding
the need for medical intervention and the cause of injury. The trial court did not abuse its
considerable and wide discretion in admitting Dr. Morgan as an expert.
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Motion for New Trial/Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict:

In order to overturn

a denial of a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appealing
party must marshal all the evidence and demonstrate how, taking all facts and inferences in a
light most favorable to the other side, the wrong result was nonetheless reached. Schindler
does not marshal the evidence and demonstrate how the outcome is outside the bounds of
reason.
ISSUE I

BECAUSE SCHINDLER FAILED TO SHOW FLOREZ' INJURIES
WERE NOT CAUSED BY THEIR NEGLIGENCE, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY DENIED SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no
genuine issues of material fact remain. "Unless the moving party meets its initial burden to
present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the party opposing
the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). "Utah law does not allow
a summary judgment movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's
case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, Tf 15, 177 P.3d 600
(emphasis added).
Schindler's motion for summary judgment first argued the heart medication caused
Connie Flore2 to faint. Being trapped in the Schindler elevator necessitated taking the heart
medication in the first instance. Further, Schindler's attempt to prove that the heart
medication caused Connie to faint, rather than the heat and anxiety of being trapped in the
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elevator, consisted of citing a single article taken from an internet website,
"www.howstuffworks.com." (R. 101). This Court should disregard and give no
consideration to Schindler's authority because it is inadmissible evidence lacking in
foundation and entirely hearsay unsupported by any medical opinion and, therefore,
incapable of supporting a motion for summary judgment. See D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) ("It is true that inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.").
Although argument regarding the admissibility of an internet article was not raised
below, this Court may affirm the lower court's denial of summary judgment on any basis
which it finds legally viable. An "appellate court will affirm the judgment. . . appealed from
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court. . . [and] even though such
ground or theory . . . was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on
by the lower court." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Because an
internet website, www.howstuffworks.com. is neither authoritative nor admissible evidence,
Schindler's argument for overturning denial of summary judgment must be refused.
Further, citing a single website as authority for the proposition that this plaintiff fell
because of nitroglycerin and not because of the fear, anxiety and heat exposure strains
credibility and cannot demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain. "[B]ecause
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly
done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only
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in the clearest instances." Sandberg v. Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C., 2003 UT App 272, ^j 5,
76 P.3d 699. Indeed, the 'howstuffworks' web article, at best, suggests that the heart
medication "may" cause 'dizziness [or] lightheadedness.' (R. 102). Because Schindler did not
prove that Florez fainted from the heart medication, Florez was not even obligated to
respond to the argument with competing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
denied summary judgment on this argument even in the absence of a response from Florez.
Additionally, Florez' affidavit provided disputed facts that she never previously
experienced a fainting episode associated with taking her heart medication. Florez' affidavit
affirmatively generates a genuine issue of material fact in the face of literature stating that the
medication "may" cause dizziness. In other words, the medication doesn't cause fainting in
everyone, all the time and, in Connie's experience, it had not caused fainting in her at any
time. All inferences from the presented facts must be taken in favor of the non-moving
party. See 3D Constr. & Dev., LL C v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,1f 1 n. 2,
117 P. 3d 1082 ("we review the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party"). Taking all inferences regarding these facts in
favor of Florez, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment.
Second, Schindler argued that Florez' prior episodes of vertigo showed that her
present vertigo was not caused by their negligence. However, the argument ignores the
distinction between Florez' prior transitory episodes of vertigo and those caused by BPPV, a
permanent condition brought on by inner ear mechanisms. Schindler offered no medical
testimony, or competent admissible evidence, to back up their theory for summary judgment.
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In effect, Schindler provided only an alternative basis for the vertigo but, did not prove that
the present injury was solely a preexisting condition. At best, Schindler's motion presented
an alternative theory of causation, but did not meet their burden of demonstrating no
material fact remained on the issue of causation. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied
the motion for summary judgment.
Causation, including proximate cause, cannot typically be resolved on motion for
summary judgment and remains within the unique province of the jury's fact finding mission.
"This very dispute [on the issue of causation] creates an issue of fact within the province of
the jury." Nay v. General Motors Corp,, 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993). ("[Djoubts about
whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved in
favor of permitting the party to go to trial"); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah
1992) citing Rees v. Albertson's Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). Here, assuming arguendo,
that Schindler has proven something other than its negligence caused Florez' BPPV, Florez
presented more than adequate evidence to require the matter be submitted to the jury.
Schindler relies on Clark v. Partners Ins Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1995) to
assert Florez had a higher burden on causation than merely demonstrating a material factual
dispute. Schindler's reliance is misplaced. First, unlike Clark, Florez presents medical
evidence of causation through Dr. Morgan. Second, Clark is easily distinguishable in that no
one, including Clark, knew how Clark had been hurt. Id. at 601. Here, Florez provides
deposition testimony, medical records, and a Rule 59(e) affidavit explaining how she was
injured. At trial, five eye witnesses confirmed Florez' description of events. Further, Dr.
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Morgan assigned Florez a 4% permanent impairment due to the BPPV as a result of the
elevator incident.
With the introduction of Dr. Morgan's permanent impairment rating, Schindler's
request for summary disposition should fail. Schindler's appeal either omits Florez'
permanent impairment or, mentions it in an effort to discredit the evaluator, Dr. Morgan.
Schindler omits Dr. Morgan's causation opinion because Dr. Morgan does not use the word,
"causation", in his expert report. In opining on Florez' BPPV, Dr. Morgan uses the term
"related to the 2004 elevator incident" rather than "caused by the 2004 incident". Schindler
also omits Dr. Morgan's deposition testimony, wherein he clarified that when he used the
term "related to" in his report, he was referring to "causation". (R. 0399 at pg. 13, In 21-24).
Although Dr. Morgan had not yet been deposed at the time Schindler filed its motion for
summary judgment, despite a pending scheduling order that allowed for more than five
months of expert discovery, an expert's use of the term "related to" has been found to be
sufficient evidence of causation to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the phrase "related to" in Red/and Soccer
Club, Inc. v. Department ofArmy, 55 F.3d 827,852 (3rd Cir.1995). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found it error to grant summary judgment on causation when the doctor's
statement was that the [plaintiffs] illnesses were "related to" defendant's negligence. (Id. at
851). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that ". . .causation
does not require that expert testimony include any 'magic words' such as 'caused by,'
rather than 'related to.'" Red/and at 853. The Third Circuit further reiterated "expert medical
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opinion on causation need not be unqualified and absolute, i.e., stated in 'categorical terms';
citing Gradelv. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674 (Pa. 1980).
In a footnote, the Red/and court recognized that evidence presented at the time of a
motion for summary judgment may not always be definitive on an issue, stating, "[o]f course,
if it could be shown, by cross-examination or otherwise, that [plaintiffs doctor] used the
term "relation" to mean "correlation" in the statical sense instead of cause in either the
medical or legal sense, the force of his testimony could be significantly affected." Redland at
N. 16. Still, it was unequivocal that "for summary judgment purposes, however, we believe
that the [plaintiffs] have introduced sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of
material fact regarding causation." Id. at 852.
Utah courts similarly conclude that "magic words" are not needed to effectuate legal
principles. See, Rinderknecht v. Luck, 965 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah App. 1998) (finding "magic
words' don't equate to binding contract); Matter of Estate of Burgess, 836 P.2d 1386, 1395 (Utah
App. 1992) (holding Utah code's approach is to eliminate unnecessary, ritualistic formality
and "magic words"); State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339, ^ 14, 143 P.3d 290 (withdrawal of
consent to search need not be effectuated through cmagic words' (citing U.S. v. Gray, 369
F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004)); Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah App.
1993) (trial court did not need to use "magic words" in its finding); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998) (in a bad faith case, trial court was not expressly required to use
"magic words of bad faith" in determining applicability of Utah code provision).
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At a very minimum, causation could be inferred from Dr. Morgan's report.
Causation can be inferred with the purpose of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party on summary judgment. See Butterfield v. Okubo 831 P.2d 97 (Utah
1992); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein <& Yielding 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1996). Even though at the
summary judgment stage "plaintiff s causation theory may appear somewhat strained, it is the
province of the jury . . . to determine whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated." Id.
at 1292 (citation omitted).
Finally, credibility judgments and argument regarding the weight of the evidence
cannot provide a basis on which to grant summary judgment. "It is not the purpose of the
summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or
witnesses, or the weight of evidence." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein <& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,
1292 (Utah App. 1996). Contrary to this clear requirement, Schindler improperly relies on
weighing Florez5 expert tesimony and report to request summary judgment.
When the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to Flore2, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment and Schindler
provides no basis on which this Court could find an error needing correction by reversal.
ISSUE II

T H E COURT CORRECTLY DENIED SCHINDLER'S REQUEST
TO STRIKE FLOREZ' AFFIDAVIT

The review of affidavits is a "highly fact-dependent question," granting the trial court
broad discretion in determining whether the affidavit was correctly based on Florez's
personal knowledge. Superior Receivable Services v. Pett, 2008 UT App 225, ^j 10, 191 P.3d 31
(upholding trial court's denial of motion to strike affidavit finding that plaintiffs statements
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were not opinion, rather based on her personal knowledge and memory which would be
admissible at trial); See Brown v. Jorgensen, 2008 UT App 225, \ 21,136 P.3d 1252 (although
defendant's affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay (properly disregarded by the trial court)
the affidavit also contained statements based on defendant's personal knowledge, thus did
not violate Rule 56(e)).
Florez' affidavit, in summary and relevant to the issues raised by Schindler on appeal,
stated she suffered an "anxiety attack which caused significant emotional and physical
distress" while trapped in the elevator. (R. 179). Florez further related her experience that,
because of this distress, "I fainted when the doors were pried open and I was assisted from
the elevator car . . . I fell to the floor on my left side and my head hit the floor hard." (R.
0180). Additionally, Florez stated that following the incident she "suffered significant vertigo
and dizziness after the fall, which has continued to the present." (Id.). Florez' statements are
based on her personal knowledge of what she experienced when exiting the elevator, and
what she continued to experience including the vertigo and dizziness after the fall.
Although some of the language in the affidavit contained statements which might be
colored as 'medical' and 'causation' by Schindler, this alone does not provide a basis on
which to strike the statements.6 In reviewing Connie's affidavit, the trial court indicated that
"There's no question that some of this is her opinion and it didn't seem to me that her
opinion was that out of line." (R. 907 at 14:5-7) Florez was describing what she experienced,
in a sequential manner, as would any person describing events in their life. The fact that
6

In the trial court below, Schindler also contended that Florez' affidavit 'contradicted' her
prior deposition testimony and the affidavit should have been stricken on that basis as well.
(R. 0220). Schindler abandons that argument on appeal.
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Florez' description of her injuries may have utilized medical terms does not equate to her
attempting to offer medical testimony. All medical evidence was offered through Dr.
Morgan's report and the introduction of admissible medical records. (R. 0183-217) Florez'
affidavit simply described what she felt and experienced when she fainted after exiting the
elevator.
Additionally, the case authority relied upon by Schindler fails to support striking the
affidavit. Schindler cites Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, H 15, 12 P.3d 1015 as
support for the proposition that "a lay person cannot offer testimony regarding medical
conditions, causation, diagnoses or treatment." (Schindler's Brief p. 32). However, Beard
expressly allowed such causation lay testimony and excluded lay testimony from its holding.
"In this case, the question is not whether the accident at K-Mart caused Beard injury, but
rather whether injuries sustained as a result of the accident at K-Mart required the
neurological surgeries." Wat 1019. Schindler does not contend on appeal that Florez lacked
expert witness testimony establishing the need for her treatment.
More importantly, Beard went on to hold it is entirely permissible for a plaintiff to
offer testimony regarding the cause of their injury and pain. "Beard was properly permitted
to testify that the accident in the store caused pain and injury. The question as to whether
such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within the common knowledge and experience
of lay witnesses." Id. at 1019.
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Indeed, it is common knowledge that people faint in response to traumatic or
frightening events as demonstrated by individuals who pass out when they have blood
drawn, or the somewhat pejorative stereotype of the housewife who passes out at the sight of
a mouse. For Florez to relate via affidavit her experience that she passed out after
experiencing the trauma and fear of being trapped in a hot elevator for over an hour goes
beyond nothing in the common everyday understanding of our world. Schindler presents no
facts or authority to show that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Florez1
affidavit and this Court should refuse to overturn that decision.
ISSUE III

SCHINDLER DEMONSTRATES N O ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
PERMITTING DR. MORGAN TO TESTIFY.

Schindler suggests that Dr. Morgan should have been prevented from testifying as an
expert on two bases: (1) Dr. Morgan's expert report allegedly lacked any mention of
'causation5 and Dr. Morgan should have, therefore, been prevented from testifying regarding
causation; and, (2) Dr. Morgan lacked the area of expertise necessary to testify regarding
causation. Absent an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not reverse the trial court's
decision to allow an expert witness to testify. "The determination as to who qualifies as an
expert witness and the admissibility of the witness's testimony falls within the discretion of
the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of this discretion, we will not reverse the trial court's
determination." Evans ex rel Evans v. Langston, 2007 UT App 240, ^j 6, 166 P.3d 621. Neither
of Schindler's arguments demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in allowing Schindler to
testify.
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1.

The Trial Court Properly Found Schindler Had Notice of Dr. Morgan's Causation
Opinion
Schindler acknowledges the "purpose of an expert report is to 'give the opposing

party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony.'" (Schindler's Brief at 34). Schindler
asserts it did not receive notice that Florez intended to offer causation through Dr. Morgan.
However, the record demonstrates Schindler had notice, but sought to impose a strained
linguistic interpretation of Dr. Morgan's expert report.
First, Schindler had unqualified notice through Florez' opposition to Schindler's
motion for summary judgment. Moreover, any question regarding Dr. Morgan's causation
opinion was quickly answered via Dr. Morgan's deposition, wherein he unequivocally stated
that "I have causation right here. It's due to the elevator accident." (R. 0399 16:13-14)
At the hearing on Schindler's motion in limine, the trial court thoughtfully reviewed
Dr. Morgan's report and made a record of the appropriate paragraphs on causation before
ruling Dr. Morgan was allowed to testify on causation. (Addendum B at 24:20 -25:4;32:1833:15) Despite this clear ruling on Schindler's motion in limine, Schindler repeated the same
notice objections at trial, (R. 375:13-379:15; R. 380:948; R. 385:6-13) prompting the trial
court to remind Schindler:
" I really don't have problems with the fact that either side in this case has
received notice of issues. This goes to the heart of my disagreement with Mr.
Lilja [Schindler's counsel] on the reading the report from the one doctor. I
think he was absolutely put on notice. Could this report have been written
better and could have had more specificity when we're talking about the
muscle/skeletal things? Yes. But I really think he was put on notice and he
knew that that's what the doctor's opinion is going to be. I don't have any
doubt your gave him notice about these things." (R. 908 at 589:9-18)

31

2.

It Was Within the Trial Court's Discretion to Find Dr. Morgan Competent to Testify
on Causation
Schindler completely ignores Flore2' presentation of Dr. Morgan's proper testimony

under Rule 702 and 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 0421-0426). Instead, Schindler
argues the court exceeded its wide discretion in this case because Dr. Morgan relies on an
underlying diagnosis made by an ENT. Consistent with the Rules of Evidence, Utah courts
recognize that an expert witness may rely upon the testimony and other records of evidence
in reaching their opinions. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974), the expert
"testified that his opinion was based on the testimony he had heard and the records in
evidence." The defendant moved to exclude the expert's testimony because he relied on the
testimony of other witnesses and other records. The court refused to strike or exclude the
expert holding that such a "challenge to the reliability of such expert testimony will be
considered as not involving its competency but its weight and credibility, which is a matter
for the jury to determine." Id. at 608.
Consistently, the trial court found:
"if Dr. Siddoway takes the stand and testified that he did a diagnosis . . . And
then Dr. Morgan takes the stand and says, I relied up Dr. Siddoway's diagnosis
to conclude [causation] . . . then I don't see why that testimony's not
admissible. You can always attack Dr. Siddoway for the prognosis or the
diagnosis in the first place. You can always attack Dr. Morgan for relying
upon it. . . But is seems to me the doctors are testifying on two different
issues, but they are entitled to rely upon each other's diagnosis." (Addendum B
at 13:14-14:11)
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Federal Notes of the Advisory Committee corroborate the trial court's decision:
[a] physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from
numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients
and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors,
hospital records, and X rays . . . His validation, expertly performed and subject
to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes. Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Rule 703
Because of Dr. Morgan's reliance upon Dr. Siddoway, Schindler concludes Dr.
Morgan's testimony is outside of his expertise. This deduction is a fallacy. Causation is Dr.
Morgan's expertise. Dr. Morgan testified how, as a doctor who rehabilitates injuries, a large
part of his training and speciality is in performing causation evaluations; he conducts these
examinations on weekly basis. Dr. Morgan admitted that although he had not offered a
causation opinion on BPPV at trial before, he does treat patients who suffer from this injury.
Dr. Morgan also testified that in addition to relying upon the ENTs, his record review and
his examination, he "boned up" on medical research into the causes of BPPV before offering
his opinion. (R. 910 at 408:2-410:12)
Schindler erroneously relies on medical malpractice cases for the assertion that a
board certified physiatrist cannot testify to causation of BPPV. (Schindler's Brief at 35-37)
However, the cases relied upon stand for the proposition that one expert witness, in a medical
malpractice case, may not testify as to the standard of care to be used by a medical professional in
a different specialty. Standard of care is not at issue in this case.
Similarly, Schindler cities to a series of extra-jurisdictional cases that are factually
inapplicable by abstracting isolated quotes from the cases to imply the cases are consistent
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with Schindler's position. A closer look at these cases demonstrate they are dissimilar and
unsupportive to Schindler's plight.7
Applicable case law indicates that "an expert witness is not strictly confined to his
area of practice, but may testify concerning related applications; lack of specialization does
not affect the admissibility of the opinion, but only its weight." Wheeler v. John Deere Co, 935
F. 2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding psychiatrist could offer a human factors opinion
on the design of a product). Similarly, it has been found to be an abuse of discretion to
restrict or exclude expert testimony based upon the lack of a particular, or preferred
speciality. See, Ho/brook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3rd Cir. 1996) (finding it
error to exclude internist's testimony on whether radiation can cause alleged injury simply
because doctor was not an oncologist who may have more experience with radiation; also
affirming court's finding that doctors' testimony based solely on review of plaintiff s history
and medical literature was sufficient to satisfy Daubert Id. at 785.); In re PaoliKK YardPCB
Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 856 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("The district court's insistence on a certain kind
of degree or background is inconsistent with our jurisprudence in this area. The language of
7

Bemson v. Silverman, 233 111. App. 689, 698 (111. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992) dealt with standard of
care in medical malpractice; Pere% v. City of Austin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36776 (W. Dist.
Texas May 5, 2008) found a psychologist didn't need prior experience or specific expertise
in "police psychology" to render expert psychological opinion in a police case; Davison v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023,1026 (Colo. 2004) upheld, under Colorado statute,
you must have a medical or psychological expert to assert "mental trauma"; Wint^ v. Northrop
Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) upheld the district court's discretion in determining
proposed expert did not meet Federal Daubert qualifications; Cromer v. Mulkey'Enters.,254 Ga.
App. 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) prevented a biomechanist from exceeding his limited role by
offering medical testimony; Sinkfteld v. Oh, 229 Ga. App. 883, 886 (Ga. Ct App. 1997) found
it error to exclude Pharmacist's testimony regarding the effects of Motrin 800 in a pregnancy
simply because he was not of the same medical speciality as the Obstetricians.
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Rule 702 and the accompanying advisory committee notes make clear that various kinds of
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, qualify an expert as such . . . In light of
the liberal Rule 702 expert qualification standard, we hold that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding [medical] testimony simply because the experts did not have the
degree or training which the district court apparently thought would be most appropriate.")
Schindler does not attack Dr. Morgan's legitimate qualifications and experience in
determining causation but rather, relies on its assertion that Dr. Morgan isn't the best
qualified to render causation in this case because he relied upon the diagnosis of Dr.
Siddoway. The trial court was within its discretion to deny Schindler's Motion to exclude Dr,
Morgan and allow Schindler to liberally attack the weight of Dr. Morgan's, and Dr.
Siddoway's, testimony at trial.
ISSUE IV

1.

W H E N VIEWING T H E EVIDENCE IN T H E LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO FLOREZ, T H E EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT T H E JURY5S VERDICT.

Schindler Does Not Meet the Legal Requirements for Obtaining a New Trial
Reviewing appellate courts sustain the denial of a motion for new trial if there is

simply an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. "Where the trial court has denied the
motion for new trial, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there was an evidentiary basis
for the jury's decision." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). Indeed, reversal of
a denied motion for new trial only occurs if the moving party can show "the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." Id. at 732.
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In order to meet this burden, the party seeking to challenge denial of a motion for
new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict carries a very high burden. The decision
of the trial court will only be reversed if "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict."
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Moreover, it is Appellant Schindler's
obligation and burden to "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict." Id. at 839. Here, the bulk of Schindler's attack amounts to insufficiency of the
evidence. Yet, Schindler wholly fails to marshal all evidence and demonstrate a deficiency so
great as to warrant setting the verdict aside on appeal.
Schindler omits Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a
determinative provision in ordering a new trial. (Schindler's Brief at 3-5). Rule 61 dictates
that Schindler must demonstrate that there was not only error by the trial court but that the
error was "substantial" or "prejudicial." New trials are denied unless it is reasonably clear
that prejudicial error tainted the proceedings or substantial justice was not achieved. Davis v.
Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1995).
Schindler failed to show any alleged error was substantial or prejudicial, warranting a
new trial.8 Two district court judges found the facts and law warranted a jury determining
whether Schindler was responsible for the injuries Florez received. Although Florez
adamantly maintains no error occurred, any error would nonetheless, need to be deemed
harmless. Morever, by examining each allegation of error, it is shown Schindler can't
8

Schindler also does not allege plain error. Any argument of plain error is waived.
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establish error because of its failure to properly marshal the evidence under any of its four (4)
arguments for obtaining a new trial:
A.

The BPPV Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Verdict

Schindler asserts there was insufficient evidence of Flore2' BPPV to support the
verdict. Schindler lumps this argument with the court's review of Schindler's motion in
limine to exclude Dr. Morgan. Schindler improperly piggybacks its arguments, i.e., if Dr.
Morgan hadn't testified, there would be no BPPV causation evidence, hence the court should
find there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. These arguments can not be
intertwined. Since the trial court found Dr. Morgan competent to testify on causation, his
opinion must be marshaled when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to the
jury. As Schindler failed to properly marshal the evidence by excluding consideration of Dr.
Morgan's opinion, Schindler's assertion that there was a lack of evidence to support the jury's
verdict should fail. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998) (holding "the one
challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict") Id at 433, citing McCorvey v. State Deft Of Tramp., 868 P.2d 41, 44 (Utah 1993).
In making its determination, the jury heard Dr. Morgan's expert opinion that Flore2'
BPPV was caused by the elevator incident; no medical expert contradicted this opinion. The
jury was also provided Florez' extensive medical history, with the fierce cross-examination of
Dr. Morgan and Dr. Siddoway based on this medical history. With Dr. Morgan's opinion on
causation, and Dr. Siddoway's opinion and first hand explanation of Florez' prior
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complaints of dizziness, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine Florez' BPPV
was caused by the elevator incident.
B.

Evidence of Florez' Damages Was Sufficient to Support the Verdict

In failing to marshal the evidence on damages, Schindler inaccurately
represents Florez provided no evidence of damages. (Schindler's Brief at 43, ^|2) Schindler
ignores the testimony from the fact witnesses, three medical providers, Florez, and the
multiple medical expense summaries. After the jury's determination of causation, Schindler's
medical expense summaries, alone, were enough evidence to justify the amount of damages
awarded by the jury. See Pettus v. Gottfried, 606 S.E. 2d 819 at 825 (Va. 2005) reinforcing,
"[t]he general rule is that when a party unsuccessfully objects to evidence that he consider s
improper but introduces on his own behalf evidence of the same character, he waives his
objection to the other party's use of that evidence." Citing Combs v. Norfolk <& Western Ry. Co,
507 S.E. 2d 355, 360 (Va. 1998), Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 413 S.E. 2d 875, 879 (1992), and
Whitten v. McClelland, 120 S.E. 146, 150 (Va. 1923).
Price-Orem v. Rollins, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), relied upon by Schindler, supports
upholding the jury's verdict. In Price-Orem, the plaintiff had significantly less proof of
damages than Florez and the jury verdict was upheld based on well established Utah
precedent that the evidence of the amount of damages suffered involves a lower evidentiary
standard than the evidence needed to establish there was a loss. Id. at 479. In Price-Orem, the
plaintiff had no evidence of any "actual" losses, compared to Florez who demonstrated the
amounts of her actual loses via multiple medical expense summaries. The Court indicated
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that "the amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if the fact of damages is
established, and the approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or projections."
Id. at 479.
Florez presented actual expenses incurred; amounts that had been reviewed and were
testified to be reasonable and customary charges within the community. Based on these
actual damages incurred, coupled with the medical experts' testimony that the future damages
would be consistent with the past few years of care, Florez' counsel properly argued
approximate future damages.
Schindler takes umbrage with Florez' reference to certain anti-inflammatory
medications when approximating future damage. The need for anti-inflammatory
medications was discussed during Dr. Amann's testimony. (R. 909 at 185) Schindler failed
to object to counsel's reference to the wrong brand name of the anti-inflammatory during
closing argument. (R. 911 at 662:10-23) Schindler cites no record for preserving this alleged
error. (Schindler's Brief at 43 - 44). Accordingly, the objection is waived.
The jury was fully aware counsel was making estimates on future medications and the
jury's role was to make its own calculations, based on the evidence. (R. 911 at 665) The
demonstrative calculations made by Florez' counsel during closing were not provided to the
jury for their deliberations. The jury's independent determination of damages, without
adopting the amount argued by Florez or Schindler in closing arguments, demonstrates there
was no prejudice to Schindler. In making their independent determination, the jury was left
with both parties' medical expense summaries and the medical testimony that the future costs
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would be similar to the costs Florez incurred over the last few years.
C.

Based on Schindler's Defense That Flore2 Suffered BPPV Prior to the
Elevator Incident, the Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury How to
Allocate Damages if They Found Florez Had a Pre-Existing Condition

Schindler asserts error for admission of jury instruction No. 28. (R. 0625)
(Incorrectly referenced as R. 0628 in Schindler's Brief at 46). Whether a trial court properly
instructed the jury is a question of law, which the appellate court will review for correctness.
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, \ 9; 992 P.2d 969; Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d
425, 429 (Utah 1998).
Schindler suggests the trial court's instruction No. 28 was not a MUJI form
instruction. (Schindler's Brief at 46, ^2) However, jury instruction No. 28 is an exact replica
of MUJI 2nd CV2018. Schindler further asserts that Instruction No. 28 "misstates the law".
In actuality, MUJI 2nd CV2018 is derived from Utah law housed in Robinson v. All-Star
Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, \ 11, 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999), Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 689,
U 14, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999), and Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (Utah
1966). Schindler fails to cite any legal authority which contradicts the above authority relied
upon in creating the MUJI form instruction.
Further, Schindler offered no alternative instruction on pre-existing conditions.
"Under Utah law, objections must be raised with sufficient specificity at trial for the trial
judge to have a legal basis for altering or rejecting the instruction . . . [the] objection must be
sufficiently precise so as to alert the trial court to all claimed errors and to give the judge an
opportunity to make corrections to the instructions before the jury retires." Jones v. Cyprus
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Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997) (refusing to consider on appeal because the
party neither requested an alternative instruction nor asked the court to reword its
instruction). Schindler offers nothing in the record to demonstrate it accurately preserved its
objection to the pre-existing instruction that would have allowed the trial court an
opportunity for correction prior to the jury retiring for deliberations.9
Where Schindler portrayed Florez's injuries as "pre-existing in nature" throughout the
trial (R. 908 at 55:2-6; 58-63; 64:2-12; 690:13-14; 693:14-16; 700:12-14; 703:11-14), the trial
court had the obligation to see that the jury was accurately instructed on the law. Kilpatrick v.
Wiley, 2001 UT 107, \ 65, 37 P.3d 1130, citing Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah
1977).
D.

Schindler Waives Any Error Based on Improper Comments at Trial

Schindler alleges Florez' counsel's comments warrant a new trial. At trial, Schindler
objected to only two of the comments listed in Schindler's brief. Further, Schindler failed to
ask for any curative instruction. As such, Schindler failed to preserve any allegations of
improper conduct for appeal. "Absent an objection by [a] defendant, we will presume waiver
of all arguments regarding the appropriateness of counsel's statements unless the error falls
into the category of plain error." Noramandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc. 2007 UT App 382, ^]
30, 74 P.3d 1, citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). See also West v.
Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), ( "[i]n absence of
timely objection the offended party is deemed to have waived the claim of error through his
9

On appeal, Schindler also asserts that an instruction should have been given on the role of
the treating physicians. (Schindler's Brief at 40-42) As Schindler did not request this
instruction at trial, any alleged error would be waived.
41

participation in the atmosphere which produced the claim of prejudice." Id. at 861; holding
no new trial warranted for counsel's reference to Johnson and Johnson as "old and big and
very successful," description of defendant being dragged "kicking and screaming into the
courthouse", counsel's attempt to testify himself and other comments of the same ilk);
Hilliardv. A.H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App.3d 374, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allegation of
misconduct on appeal was waived because defendant failed to ask the court that the jury be
admonished to ignore the statements or questions of lawyer's long litany of sustained
objections, including, reference to death, inflammatory remarks about the subject of the
lawsuit, berating witnesses and opposing counsel, violations of court orders, improper use of
"do you know" questions); Sarko^y v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., 2009 WL 2356676 *19 (N.J.
Super A.D.) (although defendant's objections to fleeting comments were sustained, counsel
failed to request a curative instruction depriving the trial court an opportunity to correct the
situation and creating waiver of error on appeal.)
a.

Notwithstanding Schindler Failed to Object to Comments Cited in Schindler's Brief.
Counsel's Comments Do Not Justify the Overturning of a Well Reasoned Jury
Verdict
As the trial court noted "this was a hard fought, hotly contested, jury trial. Emotions

did run high." (R853, ^j 2) Unfortunately, as such, there were instances wherein both lead
counsel pushed the envelope on permissible commentary. Nonetheless, the commentary
from counsel' did not rise to the level of legally requiring a new trial. See Hilliard v. A.H.
Robins Co., 148 Cal. App.3d 374, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("The factual issues were complex
and emotional. It was inevitable that the lawyers, swept up in subjective feelings for their
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respective clients, in a few instances, might have over stepped the permissible line of proper
lawyering conduct. The able trial judge . . . did not permit the trial to degenerate into a freefor-all. . . . there was substantial evidence presented to the jury to support the verdict. ..
There was no miscarriage of justice;")
Schindler relies on one Utah case to assert counsel's remarks established an improper
appealing "to the social or economic prejudices of the jury," Donohue v. IHQ Inc. 748 P.2d
1067 (Utah 1987).10 In Donohue, the Utah Supreme Court did nothold a particular comment
"improper", as asserted by Schindler. (Schindler's Brief at 47). There were multiple
comments reviewed and the Supreme Court made no determination of the appropriateness
of any specific comment. Rather, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's discretion in
allowing a new trial by stating, u[w]e are able to assess only the words as they appear in the
records. The trial judge, on the other hand, was able to note other relevant factors
such as counsel's gestures, inflection and expressions, as well as the jury's reaction...
10

Schindler strings together counsel's comments in a different order than they were presented
to create an illusion. Despite Schindler's liberty with counsel's comments, it is important to
note the few instances in which Schindler's size or corporate status was referenced during
more than three hours of opening/closing argument and four days of trial. The first
reference was merely an introduction of the defendant, coupled with the representation that
Schindler builds, installs and maintains their own elevators and thus, there is no third party
responsible. Schindler never objected to this introduction, preventing Florez or the court
from realizing there was even a concern.
The additional instance has been misrepresented by Schindler. Schindler misquotes the
record. When counsel was responding to Schindler's unreasonable tactic of engaging in no
discovery but spending a tremendous amount of money to fly Dr. Knoebel in to Utah to
claim Connie is lying and then belittling every witness on the stand as dishonest, counsel
questioned the fairness of these dictatorial tactics by "a person" and then threw in "or a
corporation". Schindler represents that counsel stated it is unjust for "a person of a
corporation" to proceed in this manner. This misrepresentation implies Schindler was being
referred to for it's size rather than the questionableness of its overbearing and condescending
tactics at trial.
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Trial courts are in a much better position than are appellate courts to assess the
overall effect of attorney misconduct at trial." Id. at 1068. (Emphasis added.)
Here, similarly, the trial court's advantageous position in witnessing the entire trial
rather than brief excerpts taken out of context, should be given deference. The trial court
admittedly did not condone some of the comments, but held that "taken as a whole and in
context, [counsel's] comments did not rise to the level of invoking the passion and prejudice
of the jury." [R. 0853,1J2)
Utah law allows "counsel wide latitude in closing arguments" and holds that
"effective argument may employ various forensic skills designed to persuade a jury to view
the evidence with a particular perspective." Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 112 (Utah 1982)
Yet, for the closing argument to warrant a new trial it would have to go so far as to "affect
the fundamental fairness of the trial" and the offended party must show that "a different
result would have occurred". Id. at 112. In this case, there is no evidence that counsel's
comments in any way affected the fundamental fairness of the trial and the jury verdict.
Still, Florez responds to the two comments objected to at trial:
1.

Comments on Schindler's Admission of Negligence

Schindler asserts Florez' counsel discussed Schindler's admitted negligence "contrary
to the court's ruling that it should not be discussed before the jury and the parties' stipulation
of negligence". (Schindler's Brief at 24) This is inaccurate. There was no pre-trial ruling that
prohibited Flore2 from discussing Schindler's admission of liability with the jury and there
was no concrete stipulation on this issue. Flore2 fought Schindler for several years on
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liability, without any concession from Schindler. Two weeks before trial Schindler submitted
a pre-trial ordering indicating there was a stipulation on liability. (R. 0657, No. 3) Florez
submitted a pre-trial order that included no such stipulation. (R. 0669-70) The trial court
signed neither party's proposed order prior to trial. (R. 0657)
Regardless of the facts surrounding Schindler's admission, Schindler fails to explain
how counsel's minor reference to Schindler's admission of liability prejudiced Schindler to
the point of requiring a new trial. The minor comments made during the first five minutes
of opening statements had no bearing on the ultimate determination of whether or not the
medical evidence demonstrated Florez was injured.
2.

Counsel's Statement That He Knew His Client

In four days of trial and in the two hours of closing arguments, Florez' counsel,
admittedly, made an inappropriate comment. Florez' counsel unintentionally stated "I know
Connie" during an off-the-cuff apology. This statement was made during rebuttal, it was not
planned and counsel was not offering testimony. Still, after reviewing how this comment
could be interpreted as vouching for his client, counsel regrets the comment.
Notwithstanding any regret, the key is whether counsel's statement warrants a new trial.
First and foremost, the statement must be put into accurate context. Florez' counsel
was reviewing the multiple allegations levied against his client by Schindler during his closing
arguments. Florez' counsel was questioning Schindler's surprising accusation in closing that,
for years, Florez had been going to doctors and taking medications for a heart condition that
was not real, i.e. it was invented to gain sympathy from people. (R. 911 at 680:2 -684:10)
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When Florez' counsel realized the volume of his voice had risen, he took a deep breath and
stated, "Pm sorry for getting upset, but I can only take so much of this - I know Connie - he
doesn't.55 (R. 910 at 716:3-21)
Contrary to Schindler's allegations of repeated, direct, vouching for the veracity of his
client, at no time did counsel state that he had personal knowledge that Connie was a truthful
person. It was the witnesses who testified Florez was truthful. (R. 908 at 81:25 - 82:2;R. 908
at 101:10-12;R. 908 at 117:7-118:1) In actuality, counsel's statement made within an apology
illustrates counsel was not intending to testify at all. Counsel was merely attempting to
explain his angry demeanor by suggesting that when you work for an individual for four
years you develop a personal relationship which lends to heightened reaction to personal
attacks versus someone who has no personal relationship with the individual - its easier for
them to assert personal attacks.
Second, even assuming counsel's apology was interpreted as "vouching for his client's
credibility'5, the comment does not warrant a new trial. In, herma v. Walmart^ 148 P.3d 880
(OK 2006), the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked at the same assertion being made by
Schindler in this case, i.e. that counsel improperly vouched for his client's credibility. The
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of a new trial by holding:
"It is improper for counsel to vouch for the credibility of witnesses. Improper
remarks used by counsel in argument, however, are not grounds for reversal
where the language was provoked by remarks of counsel for the adverse party,
unless it appears quite plainly that the verdict was influenced thereby. The rule
applies even though the language used would otherwise warrant a reversal in
the absence of such provocation." Id, at 885 citations omitted.
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While the parties may debate the meaning of Florez' counsel's statement when he
stated that he "knew Connie", it is undisputable that the statement was made in direct
response to provocation by Schindler's counsel. The statement in question was made in
rebuttal, while responding to Schindler's specific accusation that Florez had deceitfully created
a non-exist heart condition.
Schindler is unable to demonstrate that counsel's comments influenced the jury to the
extent that a different result would have occurred. See Jones v. Carve/I, 641 P.2d 105,112 (Utah
1982); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W. 2d 108, 116-117 (Iowa. 1986) (Before granting a new trial
for misconduct in arguments it must appear a different result would have been probable, but
for the misconduct.)
As observed by the trial court, the jury presented a verdict that was "well thought out,
rational, and not the result of passion or prejudice. It was not a 'runaway' jury. It was not an
excessive verdict. The verdict was well within the discretion and prerogative of the jury".
(R. 0853) The trial court's first hand perspective of counsels' comments, the evidence, and
the jury verdict, should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Schindler gave up on liability, conducted cursory discovery, relied upon internet
articles as authoritative medical evidence, failed to hire their own expert regarding causation
of BPPV, presented a single witness in opposition to Florez case at trial, and, ultimately,
relied on a defense which personally attacked the credibility and veracity of Florez, the
witnesses and opposing counsel. Schindler now asks this Court not merely for a second
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chance, but to overturn the trial court's denial of summary judgment and dismiss Flore2'
claim. Two different trial court judges and a jury found Schindler's arguments lacked
persuasive value. This Court should be equally unpersuaded by the arguments raised on
appeal. Schindler's requests on appeal should be denied in their entirety.
DATED this />'

day of January, 2010.

/XIMDY VANDYKE
^-Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
A

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for
all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds Subject to the provisions of Rule 6 1 , a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as
a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall
be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion.
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits The time within which the
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial
for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days
after entry of the judgment.

Rule 6 1 . Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific,
technical, or other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii)
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community.
Advisory Committee Note.
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule 702 as it appeared before it
was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007
amendment to the Rule added that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended
rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many respects the developments
in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and
federal approaches to expert testimony.
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be applied to all expert testimony.
In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like
its federal counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a "gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert
testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational
skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles or
methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is
receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or
techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields of
knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all "specialized"
knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular
proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on the
"work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the "work at
hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration.
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally accepted principles and
methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. It might
be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply
these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or
exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony
that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion about how they should be
applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case
specific opinion testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of
considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under section (c).
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs. non-novel dichotomy that has
served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting
admission under section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability under
section (b) must be shown by other means.
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the federal rule. Unlike the
federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold"
showing. That "threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be
admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is
broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise.
Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose
between - the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge
to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for
the trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may be
determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26, deposition testimony and memoranda
of counsel.

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be
those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion
or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Advisory Committee Note - This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The 2009 amendment adopts
changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 703 effective December 1, 2000.

Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts
or data on cross-examination.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The substance of this rule was formerly found in Rules 57 and 58, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971). The requirement that an expert disclose the underlying facts or data for his opinion when cross-examined
was formerly found in Rule 58, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The discretion vested in the trial judge to require prior
disclosure of underlying facts or data should be liberally exercised in situations where there has not been adequate discovery
in civil cases or disclosure in criminal cases.

INSTRUCTION NO.
AGGRAVATION OF SYMPTOMATIC PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS.
A person who has a [physical, emotional, or mental] condition before the time of
[describe event] is not entitled to recover damages for that condition or disability.
However, the injured person is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of the
pre-existing condition that was cause by [name of defendant's fault, even if the
person's pre-existing condition made [him] more vulnerable to physical [or emotional]
harm than the average person. This is true even if another person may not have
suffered any harm form the event at all.
When a pre-existing condition makes the damages from injuries greater than
they would have been without the condition, it is your duty to try to determine what
portion of the [specific harm] to [name of plaintiff] was caused by the pre-existing
condition and what portion was caused by the [describe event].
If you are not able to make such an apportionment, then you must conclude that
the entire [specific harm] to [name plaintiff] was caused by [name of defendant's fault.

References
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, 992 P.2d 969, 972 (Utah 1999).
Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999).
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966).
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Committee Notes
This instruction is not intended to suggest that the verdict form include a line-item
allocation of what part of the harm can be apportioned to the pre-existing condition, and
what part to the defendant's fault. That question is answered by the jury's award of
damages and should not be confused with allocation of comparative fault.
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FLOREZ v. SCHINDLER
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September 3, 2008
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January 5, 2009
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Kelly L. Wi Iburn, CSR, RPR

(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler)

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: AI I right, that brings us to
Florez and Schindler.
AI I right. This is the time set for
pretrial, but I see there are two issues floating
around that we need to address. One has a notice to
submit and the other one doesn't, but I noticed
that -- we I I, let's start.
The first one is a motion to exclude
testimony, and then the second one is an objection
that was fiIed in regards to pretr i a I d i scIosures,
correct?
MS. VANDYKE: Correct.
SPEAKER #2: Correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: AI I right.

So let's start first

with the motion in limine. That's yours.
SPEAKER #2:

It is.

I assume the Court's had

an opportunity to read the papers -THE COURT:

I have.

SPEAKER #2: -- so I'm not gonna rehash this
thing ad nauseam.

This motion goes to the testimony

of Dr. Brian Morgan, who's a doctor who's been
retained as an expert by Ms. Florez to testify both
with regard to a diagnosis of vertigo, and to testify
that that vertigo was caused by an incident on
2
Kelly L. Wi Iburn, CSR, RPR
DeoomaxMerit

(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler)

June 15, 2004, when she was trapped in an elevator.
Under the standard of Ramash (phonetic), your
Honor, which I'm sure the Court's famiIiar with, in
order for a expert to testify they have to meet some
qua I ifications.

In addition to being of assistance to

the trier of fact they have to testify with regard to
scientific principles that are inherently reliable.
They have to have properly appl ied those, and
be a person qua I ified to do that. And the testimony
has to be founded on that work.

And finally, the

testimony that's proffered must be more probative than
prejudicial .
Dr. Morgan is a sports medicine doctor.

He

has no training in entolaryngol -- boy, I have a tough
time with that one. Entolaryngology -- yeah, that's
it -- neurology, or anything associated with the
condition of vertigo, which is a condition of the
inner ear.
He testified in his deposition that what he
did is he read through these medical records and he
adopted a diagnosis that had been made by a
Dr. Siddoway.

Dr. Siddoway is a qualified doctor in

this area.
The problem that you run into is that the
person who's testifying isn't qualified.

And the
3_

Kelly L. WiIburn, CSR, RPR
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1

person who is qua I ified can't testify as an expert

2

because he's a treat i ng phys i c i an who has not been

3

designated as an expert and has not submitted an

4

expert report under Rule 26(a)(3.)

5

So what they're trying to do is get testimony

6

in through an unqual ified witness that cannot come in

7

through what would have been a qua I ified witness had

8

they compl ied with the rules with regard to experts.

9

Finally, your Honor, I think having

10

Dr. Morgan, as a medical doctor, testify to the jury

11

that this, that this is the diagnosis of this

12

Plaintiff when in fact he has no qua I ifications to do

13

so -- a I I he's do i ng, he's read i ng a, a document. And

14

he's say i ng, Th i s document says th i s.

15

Now, that gives undue weight to that piece of

16

paper because it's being parroted by a guy the jury is

17

Iook i ng at and say i ng, We I I, he's a med i caI doctor.

18

Not necessari ly understanding the difference between a

19

med i caI doctor who's a sports med i c i ne doc and a

20

medical doctor who is a neurologist.

21

So I think that there are problems with

22

regard to Dr. Morgan on that front.

Dr. Morgan

23

also -- although it doesn't appear in his expert

24

report -- in his deposition testified that this

25

vertigo condition was caused by this incident on
4
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June 15, 2004.
And he testified that he reached that
conclusion as to causation because he looked at the
medical records after that incident on that date and
he said she now had been diagnosed with vertigo. And
he said the records he saw prior to that date did not
show any condition of vertigo; therefore, this, this
incident was the cause of the vertigo.
Wei I, your Honor, first of a I I it's not
scientific testimony.
Ramash standards.

There -- it doesn't meet the

He didn't apply any scientific

principles whatsoever.

He read documents and said,

This is what I saw here and this is what I saw here.
But he's also wrong, because there is a
specific document -- and we attached it as Exhibit H
to our memorandum -- where Dr. Siddoway diagnosed this
patient as having vertigo and treated her for vertigo
two years prior.
Beyond that, Dr. Morgan has submitted no
testimony whatsoever with regard to any other injury
caused by this incident. The only thing he testified
to was that this vertigo condition was caused by this
i nc i dent.
They are trying to claim damages for rib
injury, back injury, various other injuries. There's
5__
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absolutely no testimony, no expert, nothing to
estabi ish any causation with regard to anything other
than vertigo.
And as I point out, the vertigo testimony is
highly suspect, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
SPEAKER #2: Thank you.
THE COURT:
MS. VANDYKE:

Response? Who's up?
Defendant raises the Ramash

step -- standard today to the Court, but interestingly
the Court wi I I note that was not raised in their
initial motion so we didn't have an opportunity.

That

was later addressed in the reply.
What we did do in the opposition, that I
would direct the Court's attention to, is address the
standard under Rule 703. Which of course has
superseded or encompassed Ramash standard, the more
recent rule. And how -- and we did, in our
opposition, lay out how we had met those Rule 703
standards.
The mot i on fiIed by Defendant or i g i naI Iy
discussed this issue of can Dr. Morgan testify
against -- or testify in a specialty and rely -- that
he is not -- he's relying on a diagnosis of a doctor
in another specialty.

There you go.
6
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And as we pointed out in our opposition, this
is a generally accepted practice.

There's been no

evidence introduced by Defendant or anyone that this
isn't commonly done.

And in fact even Defendant

admits that this is Dr. Morgan's specialty.
His specia Ity is actuaI Iy evaIuati ng, taki ng
records from other doctors, and determining these
types of i ssues.

You take a spec i a Ii st, he, he -- his

total specialty is rehabilitation.

You take somebody

who's injured, you evaluate the multiple areas of
injury, and you do have to refer them out to other
subspecialties for treatment.
However, he commonly -- and it's generally
accepted i n the commun i ty -- re Ii es upon the treat i ng
physician for the particular diagnosis.
what he d i d here.

And that's

He re Ii ed upon the d i agnos i s of

Dr. Siddoway, and then used his special expertise in
the area of trauma and rehabiI itat ion. Which is what
kind of causes -- what kind of areas cause vertigo.
And he determined that a trauma to the
head -- which is what was sustained by the Plaintiff
in this case -- can be a cause of this vertigo.

And

then looking upon the past history and he makes the
determination that this was the precipitating factor
that caused the vertigo.
7_
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They reference one medical record where she'd
experienced vertigo in the past. There is no
diagnosis by any doctor of the vertigo in the past.
There's no affidavit produced by any doctor suggesting
that she had a positional vertigo or diagnosis in the
past.
There was one medical record over a 50-year
history where she checked symptomology positive for
being dizzy.
vertigo.

That does not equate to positional

What that goes to is the weight of

Dr. Morgan's testimony.
Defendant i s a 11 owed then to get up and
question, Did you see this record on this date where
she complained of vertigo? Yes, I did.
s i tuat i on.

That type of

But that does not excIude adm i ss i b i Ii ty

under Rule 703.
Under Rule 703, as stated in the Plaintiff's
oppos i t i on, Dr. Morgan has met a 11 of the
requirements.

He's using a gen -- generally accepted

practice, applying it to specific facts of this case,
and using his specialized knowledge and expertise in
the area of rehabi Iitat ion to come to his conclusion.
THE COURT:

So is Dr. Morgan going to give me

his or her own opinion, as opposed to just parroting
Dr. Siddoway's? Your position is he's reviewed this
8_
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and his opinion is consistent with Dr. Siddoway's?
MS. VANDYKE: Yes. Yes, but he's taking it a
step further in the sense that he's relying upon the
diagnosis in the subspecialty, but in terms of
causation Dr. Morgan is the one with experience in
trauma, can this condition be caused by a trauma to
the head?
And in his experience, with his
rehab i I i tat i on of i nd i v i duaIs who've exper i enced
physical trauma, yes, this is a condition that can be
caused by trauma to head - - t o the head.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

So -But he didn't -- he did not -- is

he accepting Dr. Siddoway's position in regards to
what the diagnosis was as to vertigo?
MS. VANDYKE: Yes.
THE COURT:

He did not make his own

independent determination of vertigo?
MS. VANDYKE: That is accurate, your Honor.
There was -THE COURT:

But, but he's fi I I ing in the --

one chink of your case that says the vertigo could
have been caused by a blunt to the -MS. VANDYKE: Yes, trauma to the head.
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THE COURT: Trauma to the head. Trauma.
MS. VANDYKE:

Yes.

In fact, there was two

doctors -- and that's a -- reaMy a dimension that's
hard to pronounce, but it's a really -- it's a
subspecialty area. And there's different tests you
do, and they're extensive, and they're expensive
tests.
So Dr. Morgan, no, did not repeat those
tests.

He's replying -- relying on the evaluation of

actuaI Iy both S i ddoway and then there's a Dr. She I ton,
at the University of Utah, who also did some tests and
confirmed that diagnosis.
THE COURT:

So I suspect that Dr. Morgan

could have disagreed and said that this couldn't have
happened in that way?
MS. VANDYKE: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. VANDYKE:

Absolutely.

And then the last

argument that was also raised in the reply -- that we
haven't had an opportunity to respond to -- is somehow
that he can't rely on Dr. Siddoway because
Dr. Siddoway was a treating physician.

He didn't

provide an expert report.
L i ke I sa i d, th i s has j ust been ra i sed i n the
reply memorandum.

We've not opportunity -- there's
10_
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never been an objection fi led to us that somehow
Dr. Siddoway needed to provide an expert report. We'd
be happy to address them on a separate motion if
that's an issue.
But in this case I don't think it is because,
as I mentioned, under Rule 703 it is a standard and
generally accepted practice for one doctor to rely on
the diagnosis of another doctor in offering his
op i n i on.
And I know of no requirement that relying
upon the other doctor, that doctor had to produce an
expert report in order to rely on his diagnosis and
his treating records.
THE COURT:

Okay thank you.

SPEAKER #2: Yeah.

Response?

Ramash is, is the law

under (inaudible), as the Court knows. With regard to
this, Counsel just said that Dr. Morgan was gonna
testify that this condition was caused by a trauma to
the head, and her past history, and the precipitating
factors.
And none of that's in his report, your Honor.
And he didn't testify to any of that at his
depos i t i on.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

(Inaudible.)

SPEAKER #2: That's, that's, that's a
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fabrication.

His report has to contain his opinions.

That is not in his report. And what he said at his
deposition is -- when asked about this -- he said -on questioning of:
"Why did you use the word benign if
there's no difference between benign
positional vertigo and positional
vertigo?

It's your report, you used the

word, I'd I i ke to know why you used the
word.
"If I can reference to No. 33 in the
review of records, Dr. John Siddoway
gave an impression:

Symptoms quite

typical of benign positional -positional vertigo.
"I fee I that she had ben i gn
positional vertigo.
diagnosis.

I concur with his

If there seems to be a

problem with that, I would refer you to
Dr. Siddoway."
He never testified as to make -- reaching any
opinion, through any testing, through any independent
knowledge, through any study or research, that this
pat i ent had th i s cond i t i on.

He re Ii ed so IeIy on what

Dr. Siddoway had told -- had stated in the medical
12
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records.
There's no expertise involved in that, your
Honor.

He has absolutely zero training to be, to be

testifying as to this.
THE COURT:

Am I not gonna hear from

Dr. Siddoway? Or the jury not gonna hear from
Dr. Siddoway?
MR. WARD:

No, he's been subpoenaed, your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

Okay.
But that's got nothing to do with

what Dr. Morgan can testify to.
THE COURT: Well, I, I --maybe I'm missing
something, but I, I -- if Dr. Siddoway takes the stand
and testifies that he did a diagnosis of vertigo. And
then Dr. Morgan takes the stand and says, I re Iied
upon Dr. Siddigo -- Dr. Siddoway's diagnosis of
vertigo, and from that I conclude that this could have
been caused by a blunt instrument.
Then their testimony - - o r not a blunt
instrument, head trauma.

Then, then I don't see why

that testimony's not admissible.

You can always

attack Dr. Siddoway for the prognosis or the diagnosis
in the first place. You can always attack Dr. Morgan
for relying upon it.
13_
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I understand that -- I thought maybe that
your point was that the only one that was gonna
testify was Dr. Morgan. And therefore they were gonna
bootstrap Dr. Siddoway's opinion in with just using
Dr. Morgan, who never did the analysis.
But I understand Dr. Morgan's gonna testify
that the vertigo could have been caused by the head
trauma, and Dr. Siddoway is not going to testify to
that.
SPEAKER #2: We I I -THE COURT:

Now, you -- you're still -- as

long as Dr. Siddoway testifies you can always attack
his testimony.
diagnosis.

And you can always attack his

And you can always say, A, he shouldn't

have reached that conclusion, and B, Dr. Morgan
shouIdn't have re Ii ed upon i t.
But I thought you were clearly saying that
they were just gonna call Dr. Morgan, and bootstrap
Dr. Siddoway's testimony in and he was never going to
appear.

But it seems to me the doctors are testifying

on two different issues, but they are entitled to rely
upon each other's diagnosis.
SPEAKER #2: Except that Dr. Siddoway wi 11 be
giving an expert opinion and has not been designated
as an expert in this case.
14_
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THE COURT:

But isn't it as to true --

SPEAKER #2: And under (inaudible) versus
Youngblood, he's not entitled to do that.
THE COURT:

He's not entitled to, to give his

opinion as to what his diagnosis and his treatment
was?
SPEAKER #2: No. He's entitled to testify as
to the facts of his treatment.

But he is not entitled

to render any expert opinions with regard to
causation, or treatment, or anything else.
THE COURT: Well, but I didn't understand him
to do so.

I thought he was only going to testify that

she had vertigo, and that Dr. Morgan is being used to
testify as to what the cause was. Now, that's the way
I understand the chain.

And if that's the chain, then

they're entitled to go that way.
I would agree with you that, that
Dr. Siddoway, as a treating physician, can't come in
and say that the trauma caused the vertigo.

But he

can come in and say, I examined this patient, I looked
at this patient, and I diagnosed her with vertigo.
Then Dr. Morgan comes in and testifies and
says, That vertigo could have been caused or was
caused by the trauma blow to her head on such and such
a day.

I don't have a problem with that.
15_
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SPEAKER #2: Okay.
THE COURT:

I don't see that problem.

SPEAKER #2: Two things. With regard to
Dr. Siddoway.

The minute he says, And I diagnosed

her, he's giving an expert opinion.

Under, under the

Pete versus Youngblood case that is not admissible as
expert testimony because they have not provided an
expert report with regard to that.
THE COURT: No, I, I, I disagree with that
one, Counsel.
SPEAKER #2: Okay.
THE COURT:

I think that's what treating

physicians do. They're entitled to make a diagnosis.
That -- the opinion that she has vertigo would be
within his realm, as a treating physician, to make
that diagnosis.
I've a I ways v i ewed expert test i mony i n the
sense of now taking that and putting it somewhere in
regards to causation or some of the old terms that we
used to have.

1,1 understand they gotta br i ng i n an

expert to do that.
But clearly the diagnosis and the treatment
would be within that physician.

If I fall out of a

tree and break my leg, my treating physician is, is
fair to say, He broke his leg. That was a broken leg.
16_
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It was consistent with my experience as a doctor and
my expertise as a doctor, and I treated him as such.
Now, he may not be able to say that the cause
of that broken I eg was because Judge West fe11 out of
a tree or was pushed by a tree. That's gonna require
someone else to come in and show the causation. But
clearly my treating physician can tell me, It's a
broken leg, and I treated it as a broken leg.
And he's giving an expert opinion, because
you or Mr. Ward couldn't look at my leg and say,
That's a broken I eg.

We I I, maybe you couId.

But, I

mean, you wouldn't be recognized as experts because
you guys are bri11iant lawyers, you're not bri11iant
phys i c i ans.
So I, I, I see the distinction there. I
think treating physicians can give opinions, even
expert opinions, within their expertise.

But I don't

really think they're entitled to extrapolate it out
I ike other experts are required to do.
SPEAKER #2: Okay.

The next problem is this.

Once you get that d i agnos i s you say, We 11, he can come
in and testify that a blow to the head can cause that.
It's not in his report, okay?
THE COURT:

He didn't say --

In Dr. Morgan's or Dr. Siddoway?

SPEAKER #2: Not in Dr. Morgan's report.
17_
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THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2: He didn't say, This was caused
by a blow to the head that happened in connection with
this incident. When he was asked in his deposition,
this is what he said:
"So j ust to cIar i fy, because you
didn't see anything -- any prior history
of dizziness, you concluded, based on
this accident, that the accident must
have been cause -- must have caused the
vertigo; is that correct?
"That was my causation, correct."
That's it. That's all he said.

Now, they've

done a good job doing their research since then. And
now they're gonna have him come in and testify
something that's not in his report, didn't testify to
it, and it's not admissible.
His opinions have to be in his report or they
are not admissible in this court, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Vandyke, do you have a response to that?
MR. WARD:

Just want to (inaudible) --

THE COURT: Or Mr. Ward?
MR. WARD:

-- your Honor, because I was at

that depo that he's quoting.
18_
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SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I'd prefer that we
have one lawyer argue the matter.
MR. WARD: Wei I, do you want to hear what
happened at the depo?

Because he only read part of

it, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
SPEAKER #2:

I —

MR. WARD: What happened was -SPEAKER #2:

I read the entire thing, your

Honor.
MR. WARD: What happened was, when -- what he
said -- the gentleman taking the depo wasn't
Mr. (InaudibIe), it was his associate.

And I was

there.
And the associate came back and said, you
know, Are you sure you're gonna say this thing felI
(inaudible)?

Because she fell and hit her head kind

of thing.
And he said to him, Look, you've been trying
now for a long time to get me to say it's something
bes i des th i s fa I I, and I'm not gonna say that.

It's

the fa I I.
At that point, the deposition was disbanded.
He went and ca11ed Mr. (InaudibIe.) Came back in and
said, We don't want to talk to you anymore, and they
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walked out.
So I don't even know if that got on the
record, but that's what happened.

He kept going at

him, trying to get him to say anything but the falI
caused this.
And the doctor kept saying, No, I think it's
the falI.

Finally the doctor got frustrated and said

that to h i m and they ca11ed the depo.
THE COURT: Why does the report -MS. VANDYKE:

Your Honor --

THE COURT: What, what - - h e raised some good
po i nts, Iet me fo11ow up on them.

What does the

report say that was submitted?
MR. WARD:

(Inaudible.)

MS. VANDYKE:

I'll respond.

That's just

about the depo.
Your Honor, Dr. Morgan was asked to evaluate
was there any injuries as a result of this incident.
As your Honor is probably aware, frequently doctors
will come back and say, No, there wasn't.

I don't

be Iieve there was injuries. Other words there was no
causat i on.
What he determined as his conclusion was
there was a four percent impairment, meaning as a
result of the vertigo.

And he actually didn't find an
20__
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impairment for the rib injury because there is none
under the AMA guide I ines.
But he d i d say under the AMA gu i deIi nes she
has a four percent permanent impairment as result of
this incident.

Like I said, I've seen many reports

where they come back and say, No, there was no
injuries, there's no causation, there is a
zero percent impairment.
So he's wanting him -- he's now taking it to
a higher standard.

Wanting him to say, The four

percent permanent i mpa i rment as a resu11 of the
incident means I think that the vertigo was a cause of
the elevator accident.
We 11, the quest i on posed to h i m i n a Ietter
form was, Do you think she was injured as a result of
this?

If so, what injuries did he (sic) suffer?
So the response is, As a result of the

incer -- the incident, she suffered a four percent
i mpa i rment.
So it is in the report because that's his
conclusion.

Four percent permanent impo -- impairment

because of the vertigo because of the elevator
incident.

It is in his report.
THE COURT:

Are you extrapolating that from

the report, or is that clear?
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MS. VANDYKE:

It's very clear.

Like I

said
SPEAKER #2:
MS. VANDYKE:
has he.

(Inaudible.)
-- I've gotten reports, and so

In fact their doctor, their doctor came back

and said -THE COURT:

Do I have a copy of the report?

I don't, I don't -SPEAKER #2: You do, your Honor.
MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

Absolutely.
I don't remember reading that.

SPEAKER #2: Yeah, it's attached as Exhibit D
to our memorandum.
MS. VANDYKE:

And their doctor came back and

d i d just the oppos i te.

Sa i d, I th i nk there's a

zero percent impairment.

I don't think she was hurt.

I don't think the vertigo was caused by the elevator.
And Dr. Morgan sa i d, I do be Ii eve i t was
caused by the elevator incident, and so I'm awarding
her a four percent impairment.
SPEAKER #2: And if you'I I read the
conclusion that isn't there, your Honor.
MS. VANDYKE:

And I actually do have the

deposition confirming what Mr. Ward said in terms of
the testimony.

Taking a break and coming back and
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telling him, I have no further questions.
But he was never, ever asked about -- when he
said, They've done their homework, I mean, it's
ridiculous to suggest that the attorneys have created
causat i on.

He, he's a med i caI profess i onaI.

He

testified on causation.
We didn't come back and do research and
change his opinion or offer him an opinion.
about a 15-minute deposition, I believe.
check the numbers.

There was

I'd have to

But it was really short, and they

walked out.
And that's not doctor -- it doesn't go to the
deficit of Dr. Morgan.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Response?

SPEAKER #2: We 11, I th i nk you can read the
report, your Honor.

It's not --

THE COURT:

I found it.

SPEAKER #2: And you can also read the
deposition, because we've attached it. And what this
doctor said is the basis on which he determined that
this, this injury arose from and was caused by this
incident was, I felt -- and this is out of his depo:
"I fe11 that without any prior
history of dizziness, and reviewing the
records, that it was, that it was -23_
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that was causation related to the
eIevator ace i dent."
Okay?
THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

SPEAKER #2: That's the basis on which he
reached his conclusion.

That's it. And it was

repeated back to him, just to clarify, that:
"Because you didn't see any
existing -- any prior history of
dizziness you concluded, based on this
accident, that the accident must have
been caused by vertigo; is that correct?
"That was my causation, correct."
That's what he's saying.

I saw it in the

records after, I didn't see it in the records before.
He didn't say anything about trauma to the head.

He

didn't say about -- anything about doing any testing.
He didn't say anything about anything.

That's what he

said, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
report's clear enough.

No, I, I think the

I'm looking at page 6,

one -- we 11, that first one is a half a paragraph.
One, two, third, third paragraph, or the second full
one:
"It is apparent that at the current
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time the patient continues to have
symptoms since the time of the injury,
although in the medical red -- record it
states from the vestibular rehab notes
that the patient was having no symptoms
at that time.
"With the somewhat inconsistencies
of current systems versus resolution of
symptoms, I feel that the patient most
appropriately fits into the four percent
i mpa i rment of the who Ie person, as
out Ii ned i n ExampIe 35 on 312 of the
Guides to Evaluation of Permanent
Impa i rment.
"This clearly fits into Class 1
classification between 0 and 14 percent
of the who Ie person."
Then he goes on to talk about the impairment
rating.

He then goes on to talk about the fact in

paragraph 3, No. 3:
"It i s my med i caI op i n i on that the
pat i ent will need further med i caI
attention regarding her dizziness and
ben i gn pos i t i onaI vert i go."
And he goes on, and on, and on and talks
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about that.

I think a fair reading of the doctor's

report is that he's of the opinion that the accident
was the cause of her vertigo, and at least enough to
go to the jury.
They may not agree with me. They may agree
with you, they may not agree with Mr. Ward.

But I

think it's their determination to make that issue.
SPEAKER #2: Okay.

Your Honor, I'd just like

to point out that in deposition, when asked how he
wrote that -- how he arrived at that determination of
causat i on a 11 he sa i d was, I Iooked at the med i caI
records.

That's it. That is not an expert opinion,

your Honor.
THE COURT: We I I, that's gonna be the burden
on Mr. Ward and Ms. Vandyke to come in and show that
that is his level of expertise. That he's the type of
expert that can take the opinions of a I I the other
doctors, analyze them, review them, and say, I think
this was, in fact, the cause.
I do th i s a I I the t i me w i th ace i dent
reconstructionists who were never at the accident.
They never see it. They come in, they say, Officer A
testified to this, Officer B talked to this, C did
th i s.
This witness said this, this witness said
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this.

And as a resuIt of all these things I put them

together, and it is my considered opinion that X
fai led to yield the right-of-way and that was the
cause of this accident.
I don't see that analogy being any different
in this situation, if Mr. Ward and Ms. Vandyke can
make their proof.
MR. WARD:

Your Honor, I just want to point

out so that you understand what happened at the depo.
On the last page of the depo Dr. Morgan says on
line 20, page 17 -- (inaudible) very shortly -- he
says:
"You asked me for causation, I gave
you causation" -- this is Dr. Morgan -"the elevator accident. What else do
you want to ask me?
"Wei I, I just have a few more
quest i ons.
"Okay."
And then he goes through a bunch of things.
Is what he's saying is, What if I had a medical -- the
question is saying, What if I had a medical record
that said this?
Doctor sa i d, We I I, show me the record.

Then

I -- maybe it would change my opinion.
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We I I, I don't have i t.
record that said that?

But what i f I had a

He did that few times. Then

Dr. Morgan said:
"You've asked the same question.
The question is, unless I have medical
records for my review I'm going to say
that the elevator accident was the
causat i on."
Dr. Morgan said:

"Unless you show

me records that prove to me that I'm
wrong, the elevator accident is the
causat i on."
And that's (inaudible) deposition
(i naud i bIe.)
THE COURT: At th i s po i nt I'm deny i ng the
mot i on in, in Ii m i ne and we'11 proceed to, to tr i a I
accordingly.
What other issues do we have that we need to
discuss before we get there, anything else?
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I think, I think it
would be worthwhi le to discuss the fact that there is
no causation testimony with regard to any of these
other injuries.

I think that would simplify things.

It's very clear from the report that the only
i nj ury as to wh ich Dr. Morgan will test ify is vert igo.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. VANDYKE:
making two claims:

Response?

Your Honor, actuaMy she's

One's the vertigo, one the rib,

which is also discussed in Dr. Morgan's -- he talks
about i t, but he says she doesn't qua Ii fy under the
AMA gu i deIi nes.
So what he's saying is it's not a permanent
impairment.

I mean -- but he's not -- again, he's not

suggesting -- I don't know what he wants. Again, he's
suggesting a higher standard.
THE COURT: Wait a sec -SPEAKER #2: He didn't -MS. VANDYKE:

He finds the injuries are as a

resu11 of that, but they don't qua Ii fy for a permanent
i mpa i rment.
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, he -MS. VANDYKE:

That doesn't mean she doesn't

have them.
SPEAKER #2: He didn't testify that this
was -- that the rib injury was caused by -MS. VANDYKE:
SPEAKER #2:

(Inaudible.)
-- the elevator.

THE COURT: What does the specific -MR. WARD:

Doesn't matter, your Honor,

Dr. Ammon (phonetic) is coming to testify about the
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rib injury.

He's the fellow who's been working on it.

So it's the same situation -SPEAKER #2: Yeah but he can't testify as to
causation, your Honor.
MR. WARD:

He can testify --

SPEAKER #2: And neither, neither can
Dr. Morgan if he hasn't -MR. WARD:

Morgan can tes --

SPEAKER #2: -- put it in his report.
MR. WARD: Amnion's gonna testify what the
diagnosis is, and Morgan can testify to causation.
Just I ike with Siddoway.

Ammon's the one who's been

treating her, not Morgan. Ammon's the one who's been
treating her for years (inaudible.)
MS. VANDYKE:
MR. WARD:

It —

(Inaudible.)

MS. VANDYKE: Okay.

Let me just, in the same

page that your Honor cited earl ier as being definitive
he d i scusses both the ri b and the cerv i caI pI i ne
spine.

And his conclusion is he doesn't say --

there's not enough evidence to support a permanent
i mpa i rment.
But the same thing is he goes through the,
the process of where these incidents came from, this
is where she's at, this is where she started, this is
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where's she's resulting symptoms. Out of those
symptoms, under the AMA gu i deI i nes, th i s much
percentage is apportioned to that.
He can st i11 taIk about was i t caused -THE COURT: So is it your position that
Dr. Morgan is going to address the issue of causation
here?
MS. VANDYKE: Yes.
THE COURT:

But he's going to say that it

doesn't qua Iify for a permanent -MS. VANDYKE: Yes.
MR. WARD:

Right.

MS. VANDYKE: That's exactly what he's gonna
say.
THE COURT: Okay.
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, it's not in his
report.

He found, he found no evidence of a rib

injury whatsoever.
MS. VANDYKE: That's, that's not true.

He

discusses it in detail and makes the conclusion though
that because -- it's on that exact same page that the
Court decided as being significant on vertigo:
"I do not fee I the pat i ent has a
permanent impairment of her ribs, as she
is currently only reporting subjective
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symptoms of pain. And without
radiographic evidence of a rib fracture
or rib abnormal -- normalies...."
So he talks about the rib pain.
something she can still claim?

But is that

Absolutely.

Just

because it's not an i mpa i rment under the gu i deI i ne
does not disqualify her from making the a I legation
regarding the injury.
And aga i n, the treat i ng phys i c i an will
testify about what that treatment has to undergo
because of that.

Dr. Morgan will test i fy where that

came from.
SPEAKER #2: And your Honor, there's nothing
in that report where he says anything except that he
can find no evidence of a rib injury.

He never makes

any statement that there's a rib injury caused by this
i nc i dent.
THE COURT: What is this language that she's
reading? Why does he say:
"I do not fee I the pat i ent has a
permanent impairment of her ribs, as she
is currently only reporting subjective
symptoms of pain. Without radiographic
evidence of a rib fracture or rib
abnormalities I do not feel there is
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justifiable evidence to support a
permanent i mpa i rment."
Doesn't that imply that -SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, he's -- she's going
in and saying, I've got a rib injury.

And he said, I

don't see anything that indicates this.

He doesn't

say anything about having any causal I ink to this
i nc i dent.
MR. WARD:
analysis.

Then he can attack Dr. Morgan's

But that doesn't mean it precludes the

test i mony.
THE COURT:

I think it goes to the weight.

I, I - - s o far I'm, I'm convinced they can go ahead on
the rib injury and they can go ahead on the vertigo.
Is there anything else we can Iimit in this matter?
SPEAKER #2: We'd I ike to -MS. VANDYKE:

(Inaudible) just the objection

on the pretrial disclosures.
SPEAKER #2: Yeah, we'd Ii ke to taIk about
witnesses and.

I mean, I think the problem with the

pretrial disclosures is we did -- we, you know, put
everyone in there because we didn't know if we were
gonna be able to reach a stipulation on medical
records.

And we have, I be Ii eve.
Is that right, Erik?
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MR. WARD:

Schindler)

I hope s o .

SPEAKER #2: Yeah.
MR. WARD:

You sent me one, and.

But I haven't got it, so.

SPEAKER #2: And I've got it, I've got it
w i th me and we'11 s i gn that.
THE COURT:

So how much --

SPEAKER #2: So that eIi m i nates the med i caI
providers.

The other thing is, your Honor, we are

w i11i ng to st i puI ate to negIi gence.
THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2:

If that wi 11 el iminate from

testimony our two employees that they have Iisted.
Who are Vince Garcia and Tony Hal I.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And are you wi I Iing to

accept that stipulation?
MR. WARD:

Uh-huh (affirmative.)

THE COURT: Well -MS. VANDYKE:

We are, your Honor, but the one

thing is -THE COURT:

You're cond i t i onaI and he's yes.

MS. VANDYKE: No.
THE COURT:

So I gotta admit, it's no fair to

double tag team him. Do you two agree, or -MS. VANDYKE:

Wei I, I'm handling the

objections of pretrial disclosures.
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MR. WARD:

Forgive me, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2: Yeah.
MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

So -Yeah, I --

SPEAKER #2: So I think what that does -MS. VANDYKE:

The problem I have is, is we'I I

go ahead -- the liability is not the issue.

But

eIi m i nat i ng -- I don't th i nk the med i caI records
stipulation takes care of the fact that they named 60
individuals as the documents.

I think -- as their

disclosure of documents.
We st i 11 need a pre -- a new pretr i a I
disclosures from the Defendant.

There is absolutely

no way that we can prepare for trial based on the
information they've provided to us.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But, but he's asked today

if you -- you've reached a stipulation in regards to
the med i caI records.

He's asked you today i f you'I I

accept the st i puI at i on on the i ssue of negIi gence,
because that gets through with two more witnesses.
How can he prepare a new order unti I he finds
out what you are going to agree to or not agree to as
of today?

Because he -SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

Sure.
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MS. VANDYKE:

Actually, we already --

SPEAKER #2: Can I make a suggestion?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. VANDYKE:

The rec -- medical records

stipulation has been out there for two weeks, and we
already admitted I iabiIity over a week ago, so those
were already known.
THE COURT:

I understand.

SPEAKER #2:

I'd like to --

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

I'd I ike -- I want to

hear your suggestion.
SPEAKER #2:

I haven't spoken to Counsel

about th i s, so I guess psych i c powers (i naud i bIe.)
Here's the thing.

With that agreement we have one

witness, okay?
THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2: Which is our medical expert. I
don't know how many witnesses they have.

But I can

tell you that. That's our witness, okay?
THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2: So why don't they teI I me who
their witnesses are, and then we can cut through this.
MS. VANDYKE:

We provided our pretrial

disclosures -THE COURT:

Who - 36_
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MS. VANDYKE:

-- and those are our witnesses.

SPEAKER #2: Which was, your Honor, about as
extensive as ours.
MR. WARD:

Oh.

THE COURT:

How many, how many, how many do

you have?
MR. WARD:

Easily.

THE COURT:

How many do you have?

MS. VANDYKE:
there.

And Iet me puI I it out, I have it attached.
THE COURT:

one.

I think there's five I isted on

So you've got five and he's got

I'm Iook i ng at a ha If a dozen w i tnesses totaI on

this thing?
SPEAKER #2: Those, those were their wi 11
calls.

And then they, they did the same thing, your

Honor, they I i sted a 11 of the med i caI prov i ders -MS. VANDYKE:

We I isted --

SPEAKER #2:

-- as may calls, like we did. I

mean, it's -THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2: You know, it's standard
pract i ce.
MS. VANDYKE:

No. We listed 7 individuals

versus 60, your Honor.
MR. WARD:

We listed seven (inaudible.)
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THE COURT

Okay.

So, so the anticipation is

we'11 sti 11 get through in four days?
MR. WARD:

Oh, absolutely.

SPEAKER #2:
THE COURT

Sure.
Okay.

MR. WARD: E3ut our problem with the
(inaudible) is we, we don't know whose (inaudible.)
He's 1 i sted 60 names And so we -THE COURT

But he's now told you, he's now

told you he's down to one. His doctor.
MS. VANDYKE : But, but you know what? We
have no 1i st of any documents.
the documents.

He 1 i sted 60 names for

Not for the witnesses --

SPEAKER #2: Your Honor -MS. VANDYKE :

-- for the documents they were

produc i ng.
SPEAKER #2:
MS. VANDYKE

1 -He 1isted 60 names.

SPEAKER #2: Another suggestion?
THE COURT:
SPEAKER #2:

Yes.
1 will g i ve them cop i es of the

documents 1 intend to introduce into evidence.
MS. VANDYKE

Great.

SPEAKER #2: They can give me copies of the
documents they intend to introduce into evidence.

38 1
Kelly L. Wi Iburn, CSR, RPR
n Q n n m o v l i l l n r i +-

(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler)

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. VANDYKE: That wi I I be great. Can we set
a date for that?
SPEAKER #2: With the medical records
stipulation, your Honor -THE COURT: Yes.
SPEAKER #2: - - i t strikes me, the only
medical records that need to come into evidence are
those that anyone thinks have specific meaning to the
injuries that we're now dealing with.
THE COURT: Okay.
SPEAKER #2: Okay? So I think those should
be marked separately, by either party, to the extent
they i ntend to use them at tr i a I. Other than that, we
stipulated that the medical records are in evidence.
THE COURT: Okay.
SPEAKER #2:

Is that fair, your Honor?

THE COURT:

How long are you gonna need?

Is

the 17th too late?
MS. VANDYKE:

I thought we stipulated to

founda -SPEAKER #2: That's fine with me.
MS. VANDYKE:

-- foundation only.

that the med i caI records were adm i ss i bIe.

Not all
I'm sorry,

but that's what -- the agreement that we've signed off
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on.
We rneed date -- dates for exchange of
exhibits -THE COURT:

1 said.

MS. VANDYKE:

-- and j ury i nstruct i ons, 1

think is the next step.

Is that what we're talking?

THE COURT: Well, no.

1 want to --

MS. VANDYKE: Oh.
THE COURT:

1 want to deal with this.

MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

What?
Your exchange of witnesses.

SPEAKER #2: Of exhibits?
THE COURT:
Is the seven

1

And, and your proposed documents.

--

MS. VANDYKE:

1've a 1 ready prov i ded those,

your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

Okay.
We don't have anything to change.

(1naud i b1e.)
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor -MS. VANDYKE:

We've already provided it.

SPEAKER #2:

-- if Counsel is saying that

1

they are not st i pu1 at i ng to the adm i ss i b i1i ty of the
medical records into evidence? All bets are now off.
MS. VANDYKE:

Okay.
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THE COURT: You're, you're not st i puI at i ng to
the medical records?
MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

Well, your Honor -I --

MS. VANDYKE:

-- because we don't know what

they are yet.
SPEAKER #2: You've got -- everything we've
got has been produced by them, your Honor.
MR. WARD:

Your Honor, that's not true.

He

sends us a I ist of 60 names -- half of them we don't
even recogn i ze -- of records that he ca11s med i caI
records that he's gonna put in, and he wants us to
stipulate to them.
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I -MR. WARD:

We don't even know what he's

talking about.
SPEAKER #2:

I --

MS. VANDYKE:

I have it right here. May I

approach and just give you the Iist?
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, I'm wiI I -- I'm
w iI Ii ng to teI I you -THE COURT:
SPEAKER #2:

Okay.
-- as I'm standing here today.

I have no medical records that they did not provide to
me.

I w i 11 not seek to put i n ev i dence any med i caI
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record that they did not provide to me.

But I need a

st i puI at i on as to adm i ss i b i I i ty i nto ev i dence, or eIse
we're gonna be here for a couple of weeks.
THE COURT:

So he's now offering to

stipulate -MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

Just --- to a I I of your medical

records, and he will produce no red -- medical records
that you haven't produced to him.

Are you accepting

that?
MS. VANDYKE:

The problem is, your Honor,

without seeing them, I don't know - - w e signed
releases.

And they have stacks and stacks of records,

some of wh i ch may be i nadm i ss i bIe because they're
irrelevant, prejudicial.

I don't know unti I I see

them.
I've got such a wide -- she's 55 years old.
THE COURT:
MS. VANDYKE:

Okay.
As you're aware, there's OB/GYN

Ii sted on the i r records, there's -- I don't know what
the records are untiI we get some answer.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:
MS. VANDYKE:

(Inaud i bIe.)

All I want is their pretrial

disclosures, and then I think we can enter - - w e can
make a better assessment.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

So what -- I'm, I'm, I'ma

But te11 me, he -- you want him

1 i t t 1e bit confused

to go through your records and tel1 you which of your
records that he intends to rely upon?
He's te11 ing me blanket, up front, he's not
gonna rely upon any med i ca1 records that you haven't
produced.

And -MS. VANDYKE: We'11 , we'11 g i ve him a copy of

al1 of our medical records, yes.

We're j ust ask i ng

that in addition to the ones; we're submitting he gives
us a copy of those he wants to adm i t.
SPEAKER #2

That'sail.

1 thought 1 just proposed that,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

He did.

SPEAKER #2
MR. WARD:

He, he --

Maybe 1'm wrong.
Okay.

THE COURT:

But --

MS. VANDYKE:

Okay.

Let's set a date for

that.
SPEAKER #2 : But -- and 1 want to know if we
have a stipulation as to adrri i ss i b i1i ty of those,
because otherwise 1 've gotta get subpoenas out for all
these prov i ders.
THE COURT:

Well, 1 think you have a

st i pu1 at i on as to adm i ss i bity,
i1 subject to you two
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exchanging what those documents are.
AlI right.

SPEAKER #2:
MR. WARD:

We can do that in five days.

THE COURT:

I agree, everybody gets to look

at those documents
Okay, let's do that. And if

SPEAKER #2:

anyone has an objection -THE COURT:

Bring it back.

SPEAKER #2:

-- let's raise it within three

days of that so that we can come back up here and
figure this out.
THE COURT:

I agree.

SPEAKER #2:

I agree.

Okay?

MS. VANDYKE :

Okay.

Back to the original

i ssue, which is our objection to their pretrial
disclosures.

Can we get a new pretrial disclosure?

If he wants to 1ist one witness and it wi I I take him
five minutes, that's fine.
But as i t stands, when he's 1i sted over 110
peop1e

--

SPEAKER UNKNOWN:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible.)

1

WelI, don't --

MS. VANDYKE :

That means they can calI 110

peop1e in and we've lost our objection.
THE COURT:

But he has stipulated today on
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the record -- which you may reduce to writing if you
want to -MS. VANDYKE: Okay.
THE COURT:

-- he only intends to call one

w i tness.
MS. VANDYKE:

Okay. Great.

THE COURT: And who is that, the doctor?
SPEAKER #2: The doctor.

Based on the

st i puI at i on as to adm i ss i b iIi ty of med i caI records.
THE COURT: Right.
SPEAKER #2:

If that isn't stipulated to,

your Honor, I'm gonna calI whoever I need to calI to
get them into evidence.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. VANDYKE: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay. And, and that will be
cured, because you'll both look at the records and
dec i de what med i caI records you're gonna have come i n.
And he's gonna -- and he said for the record today
that whatever records you gave him is what he's
considering fair game, so.
MR. WARD:

Can we agree that we'I I have

everything exchanged by Monday? He gives us his, and
we'11 give us -- him ours?
THE COURT: Monday is fine, the 8th.
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MR. WARD:

Is t h a t okay?

MS. VANDYKE:

MR. WARD:

Schindler)

No.

(Inaudible) is that okay?

(Inaud i bIe) you want to go Iater?
THE COURT:

You want to go the 12th?

SPEAKER #2: Yeah, give us the 12th, your
Honor.
THE COURT: We'I I go the 12th, Friday.
MS. VANDYKE:

Okay, so 9/12.

And what about, do you prefer a stipulated
set of jury instructions too, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Well, my traditional preference

has been you have a 11 my stocks. The on Iy ones I
really want from both sides are the ones that you
th i nk are part i cuIar to your case i f you d i sI i ke my
stocks.

You can ask Ms. AI I en and she'II maiI out the

stocks to you.
UsuaMy I give my stock instructions, and
then we argue over the ones that you may think are
appiicable to the Plaintiff's case and you may think
are applicable to the Defendant's cases.

Those are

the ones -- I don't want you both to submit to me the
jury can take notes, that they need to pay attention,
that preponderance of the evidence, you know.
But which one you want to use for causation,
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which one you want to use for damages.

I mean, I

don't know if there's lost wages, general damages,
specific damages, future wages, reductions,
actuarials.

I mean, I don't know enough about your

case to know those specifics.
So those kinds of instructions, yes. And I
wouId Iike those by the 17th.
MS. VANDYKE:
THE COURT:

Seventeenth.
But bas i ca11y I'm gonna g i ve my

stock instructions, and then we'I I argue about
whatever instructions you want specifically given to
your case.
SPEAKER #2: Your Honor, where can I get your
stocks?
THE COURT:

She -- just telI Ms. Allen you

want them and she'11 down Ioad them off the computer or
she'I I send you a d i sk.
MS. ALLEN:

I, I have them i n back.

I can

run and get you each a copy if you, if you want me to.
SPEAKER #2: Oh, that would be super.
THE COURT: Yeah, we can do that today.
SPEAKER #2:

(Inaudible) voir dire, your

Honor?
THE COURT: Voir dire.
usually start the voir dire.

I usually allow -- I

I ask a few questions,
47_

Kelly L. WiIburn, CSR, RPR
DepomaxMerit

(September 3, 2008 - Florez v. Schindler)

because my concern is to make sure that we have a
general panel.

Then I turn it over and I do allow

attorneys to conduct their own voir dire.
The only thing I reserve is -- I'm pretty
I i beraI.

But I'll usua11y cut you off at the knees i f

I think you're getting out of I ine, rather than taint
the who Ie poo I.

I th i nk you're ent i 11ed to ask

reasonable questions that help you exercise preemptory
chaI Ienges.
But if I find that you are educating the
jury, or you're trying to lay the foundation for your
theory of the case i n such a way you're try i ng to
argue it or convince them as opposed to just giving
them examples, I'll probably cut you off. We'I I
excuse the j ury.

And we'I I taIk about where you're

head i ng.
But I do a 11ow you fu11 re i n to fo11ow up
because I don't have to exercise preemptory
cha11enges, you do. And so there may be some nuances
as to why you wouId want to excuse a juror for some
reason less than cause that's not important to me.
I usually start with the Plaintiff, then I
give the defense foI Iow up.

You have fu11 rein.

If

there are questions that you want me to ask -- a lot
of t i mes tort I i ab iI i ty quest i ons or those k i nds of
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th i ngs -- I wouId I i ke those by the 17th as we I I. The
questions that you want me to ask.
Sometimes they come across better if the
judge is asking those questions.

But by and large I

let you guys -- you folks ask whatever questions you
want to ask.
MR. WARD:

How big will our pool be, your

Honor?
THE COURT: We 11, I was gonna ask you how b i g
you thought we needed it to be. Our -- I've heard of
Schindler Elevator Company.

I don't know Ms. Florez.

Twenty-five is normally -- 25/35 is what we calI. I
have gone to 50 in high profi le cases, but.
MR. WARD:

I would think 25 to 30 would be

fine.
THE COURT:

Because we only need eight.

SPEAKER #2: That should be fine.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WARD:

I think one other thing I was

gonna have, have an opportunity to mention this to
Scott or to you, your Honor, but I be Iieve this -- for
us to discuss.
I have found everybody we 11 served in tri a Is
with this kind of adjusted schedule that you may have
heard about, where you start your trial at 8 and end
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it Iike at 2:30.

So that they can get back to thei r

office in Salt Lake, and everybody has some time.
I have some j udges that Iove to do that, and
we've done that.

I've had other j udges say, No, I

want to do the norma I 9 to 5. And I, and I j ust Ieave
it out there for whatever.

Since they're travel ing

from Sa11 Lake (i naud i bIe.)
SPEAKER #2:

I think it's, I think it's a

great schedule, your Honor.

I've done it quite a bit,

and (i naud i bIe.)
THE COURT:

I don't, I don't have a problem

with it, as long as you guys know I'm butting up
against another trial that starts on the 29th. You
have to be through in four days.
breaking Wednesday.

I -- and I am

We're going Monday, Tuesday,

break Wednesday, and come back Thursday and Friday,
so.
MR. WARD:

With, with them admitting

I i ab iI i ty and hav i ng the i r one ma i n w i tness I can't
imagine -THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. WARD:

-- just can't imagine we wouldn't

THE COURT:

I don't mind breaking earlier in

be done.

the day, 2:30, 3:00.

That, that's fine.
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SPEAKER #2 : Just, just so we're clear, what
we' re admitting is the element of negl igence, your
Honor
THE COURT:

R i ght.

SPEAKER #2

Okay?

THE COURT:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2 : So -THE COURT:

So I don't, I don't have any

problems with -MR. WARD:

Is everybody okay with an 8:00

THE COURT:

Oh, I don't know if my staff's

start?

okay with an 8:00 start.
MR. WARD:

That's why (inaudi ble.)

THE COURT:

I -- when you sai d --

SPEAKER #1
THE COURT:

(Inaud i bIe.)
I was thinking, I was thinking in

terms of the other end.

I wasn't thinking of starting

earlier.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

The j urors, the j urors have

to be here a Iittle bit early, so the door will have
to be (inaudible.)
THE COURT:

We'd be -- if we're gonna start

early we'd have to start at 8:30 would be the
ear 1i est, because the bu i1d i ng doesn'topen till
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eight.

So I've got problems getting jurors in at 7:30

to be here at 8. That -MR. WARD: So it opens at 8:30, or it opens
at 8?
THE COURT: No, it opens at 8.

So I could

have them in the building, searched, and ready to go
at 8:30.

I -- she's right, I can't have them ready to

go at 8 because we don't open the bu iId i ng that -MR. WARD: Then maybe we could, if everybody
would agree, lunch would be 30 or 40 minutes instead
of an hour or an hour and-a-half.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WARD:

(Inaudible) kind of get the

business done so everybody can go home.
THE COURT:

I don't have a problem with that.

So we'11 plan on starting at 8:30.
MR. WARD: Okay.
THE COURT: And capping the day somewhere
around three, depending upon witnesses. My -- I'll be
candid.

My experience with the flex days is we've

been held hostage by our witnesses.

Particularly

doctors, who can only come a certain day at a certain
time.
And so you folks move through the case much
faster than they do, and then we've got a two-hour
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block where we have to wait because Doctor X or Doctor
Y can't come in.
MR. WARD:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

But yes, 1 don't have any

prob1 ems-with starti ng at 8:30.
prob1 ems.with capping it at 3:00.

1 don't have any
1 don't have any

prob1 ems. with flexibi 1ity during the lunch hour
e i ther.
But 1 think we almost have to say that's the
genera 1 approach we' re gonna take, but day-to-day we
have to assess where we are with our witness.
SPEAKER #2:
THE COURT:
SPEAKER #2:

Yeah.
Okay.
Yeah.

With regard to that, my,

my medical expert's scheduled to be here on Thursday.
THE COURT:
SPEAKER #2:

Okay.
1 assume that would be a good

time?
THE COURT:
SPEAKER #2:

That wou1d be an exce11ent t i me.
1 assume we have some

flexibi 1ity with regard to witnesses if -THE COURT:
SPEAKER #2:

Yes.
- - w e need to take them out of

turn?
THE COURT:

Yes.
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SPEAKER #2

Thank you.
Yeah, we can take them out of

THE COURT:
turn
MR. WARD:

Is that Thursday morning?

SPEAKER #2 : Yeah, Thursday morning.
THE COURT:

Yeah, okay.

Anything else we

need to address?
Al1 right.
22nd

8:30, ready to go. Thank you.
MR. WARD:

8:30

We'11 see you a 11 back on the

Wei 1, if we're gonna start at

your Honor, 1 wonder, particularly if we have

some jury instructions or anything to go through at
al 1, should we get together on a phone conference
maybe the day before?
THE COURT:

We 11, 1, I'm expect i ng you to

submit those to me 1Dy the 17th.
MR. WARD:

(Inaud i bIe.)

THE COURT:
call you.

I wi I I review them, and then I'll

1 mean, I'll, I'11 fo11ow up on that i f we

have some issue.
MR. WARD:

Okay.

SPEAKER #2 :
MR. WARD:

Okay.

So maybe we can think of things

(inaudible) before if we need to -THE COURT:

Right.
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MR. WARD:

-- tie ends up?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. WARD:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
SPEAKER #2: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Have a good day.
(End of recording.)
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